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2-3 Communication Motivations 
The  future  of the  aircraft  industry  in  Western 
Europe is  of importance to the Community for  a 
number  of reasons.  The  existing  industry  is  a 
major  source  of employment.  It  is  one  of the 
chief  representatives  of  a  type  of  employ-
ment-highly skilled, commanding  sophisticated 
technologies  and  a  high  level  of  invest-
ment-towards  which  the  Community  must 
necessarily  move in  the future as  the industrial-
ization of the Third World proceeds  and a wider 
international  division  of labour unfolds. 
Furthermore, the research  and development  car-
ried on by the aircraft  industry has  proved to  be 
a major source of scientific invention and techno-
logical  innovation  across  a  wide  range  of  pro-
ducts. 
And  of  course  Western  Europe's  capacity  to 
make  an  appropriate  contribution  to  its  own 
defence  must depend  in  large  measure upon the 
strength of its  aircraft  industry. 
Nevertheless, in spite of its importance the Euro-
pean  aircraft  industry  faces  serious  difficulties 
which  have  put  a  question  mark  against  its 
future. 
In  a  large  part  these  difficulties  are  due to  the 
divergent  policies  of  the  Member  States  with 
regard to the  aircraft industry, despite their finan-
cial  aid  to the launching of major civil  and  mil-
itary  programmes  (averaging  400  million  u.a.  a 
year  between  1969  and  1973  on  civil  R & D 
alone)  and despite  numerous  cooperation  agree-
ments. 
These conflicting policies  have had consequences 
all  the  more  harmful  since  they  have  arisen  in 
the  present  poor  economic  climate  with  all  its 
effects  on air  transport  in  particular. 
Criticism  of policy  in  recent  years  can  be  sum-
med  up as  follows: 
- resources  have  been  spread  over  too  many, 
sometimes  competing,  civil  and  military  pro-
grammes;  this  has  made  production  runs  too 
short and even  led  to  cancellations; 
- no overall, market-orientated strategy to coor-
dinate  the various  aeronautical  programmes; 
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- a lack of adequate support for  marketing and 
for  developing  existing  products; 
- decision-making  powers  dispersed  among the 
Member States, and in  some of them, inefficient 
division of responsibilities between industrial sec-
tors,  airlines  and sponsoring  bodies. 
The European aircraft industry with all  its  weak-
nesses  is  confronted  by  the  powerful  American 
industry which not only dominates the Europe;:m 
market, but  is  also  preparing  to  gain  a  foothold 
in  the  Community  itself  by  means  of bilateral 
agreements  with  certain  Member  States  (Italy, 
with  the  7 X 7,  Belgium  and  Holland  with  the 
F 16). 
The European industry, however, has two impor-
tant  advantages: 
- it  has  a  real  technological  capability,  and  its 
civil  and  military  products  could  compete  on 
world  markets  if all  its  technological  and  com-
mercial  possibilities could be harnessed to  a joint 
effort; 
- the growing size (in relative terms) of markets 
outside  the  United  States  should  provide  new 
opportunities  in  the next  ten years,  if the Euro-
pean  industry can  provide  competitive  products. 
In  the  years  1969-74,  the  American  market 
amounted  to  just  under  half of the  'Western' 
civil  transport  market,  and  the  'Rest  of  the 
World' and 'Europe' shared the remainder almost 
equally.  By  contrast,  it  is  estimated  for  the 
decade  1975-85,  that  the  'Rest  of the  World's' 
share will  become the largest, leaving a 1ittle ove.r 
one-third  of demand  to  the  United  States· and 
about one-quarter to  Europe. 
To  set  against these advantages and possibilities, 
however,  there  is  the  fundamental  fact  that the 
aircraft  industries  of our  Member  countries,  as 
they are  at  present organized, are  too  small  and 
too  fragmented  to  develop  themselves. 
This fact  has of course been recognized over the 
past  decade  in  a  proliferation  of  bilateral  and 
multilateral cooperation agreements .between  par-
ticular  Member  States  and  their  industries  of 
Documentation  on  this  section  can  be  found  in  Annex I. 
7 which  those for  the Airbus  and  the MRCA 1 are 
the  most  significant. 
But even intensification of this  kind  of coopera-
tion  will  not  ensure  for  the  aircraft  industry  of 
the Community the  future  which  its  needs  and 
possibilities  demand. 
The development of the aircraft industry, with its 
important  inputs  of  new  technology,  requires 
clear  strategies,  systematic  long-term  planning, 
and  coherent  management.  And  because  of the 
high  level  of investment which  must be  under-
taken  it  requires  a  wide  capital  base,  secure 
financing,  good  market  prospects,  and  the avoi-
dance of the kind of waste that arises from dupli-
cated. efforts  and  lost  opportunities  for  rationali-
zation. 
1  Multi-Role  Combat  Aircraft. 
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The  market 
The  market,  and  especiaHy  the  internal  market, 
is  the first  thing to consider when examining an 
industry's development  problems.  The European 
aircraft  industry  can  only  build  a  secure  future 
upon  a  genuine  capacity  to  fulfil  the  needs  of 
consumers defined in a competitive market, both 
internally and externally.  Moreover, the evidence 
shows  that  the  aircraft  industry  cannot  hope  to 
achieve a sustained penetration of export markets 
(though  these are  essential to  it)  where competi-
tion is  keenest, if it  is being progressively pushed 
out  of its  home  market. 
A common policy limited to the civil  market and 
ignoring  the  military  market would  be  meaning-
less in a sector which supplies both, with the mil-
itary  market accounting for  oveF 60%  of output. 
However, the approach  will  be  different depend-
ing  on whether the  civil  market  or  the military 
market  is  considered. 
The European civil market  1 
To  have a European  aeronautical  policy  requires 
the  creation  of a  true  European  market  which 
should  provide  the air  transport  companies  with 
the most favourable  economic conditions for  the 
growth  of their activities.  A  common  policy  for 
air  transport  which,  under  the  terms  of ·the 
Treaty  requires  the unanimous agreement of the 
Council, has  as  yet  not been decided  upon, and 
consequently  European  air  services  result  from 
regulations  made  at  world  level. 
The Commission considers  that  it  is  desirable  to 
move beyond the present situation which is  char-
acterized  by  rigidly  compartmented  national 
markets,  in  which  traffic  shares  are  divided  pri-
marily  as  a function of the air transport compan-
ies'  nationality. 
Any  Community action  in  the field  of air  trans-
port must take  into  account  the world-wide  nat-
ure of many of the Community's air services and 
the need to  avoid  abrupt changes in  the existing 
I  For  market  statistics,  see  Annex I,  page  20. 
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improve  the  close  and  traditional  links  which 
exist  with  certain  other European  countries. 
The  Ruling  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  case 
167174 1  lays  down  that  the general  rules  of the 
Treaty apply to air transport.  The Commission is 
currently examining the implications of this with 
the assistance  of experts of Member  State.s. 
Such  an approach,  which  is  in  keeping  with  the 
Commission's  role  as  guardian  over  the  Treaty, 
should be complemented at the same time by the 
adoption  of a  Community policy  which  aims  at 
the  creation  of a  Community  market  replacing 
the present systems and  which  would  be created· 
gradually, bearing in mind the complex nature of 
the current  problems. 
Such  a  policy  would  have  as  its  general  objec-
tives: 
- the creation of a European airspace, managed 
at  the  Community  level  creating  in  respect  of 
intra-Community traffic a system of competition 
which would be  regulated with a view  to  provid-
ing the public with those services best adapted to 
their needu, at the most economic prices, through 
the  innov~tion and  diversification  of those  ser-
vices  and  the  rationalization  of the  route  struc-
tures,  particularly  for  inter-regional  traffic; 
-joint negotiations of the Community's agree-
ments with  third countries, particularly on traffic 
rights, which would have the effect of improving 
the  Community's  bargaining  power  and  would 
lead  to  optimizing  international  routes  and  ser-
vices. 
The  Commission  feels  that  in  the  immediate 
future,  on  the  basis  mainly  of Article 84  para-
graph 2  of the  Treaty, certain  actions  should  be 
undertaken which  would  aim  at: 
- improving intra-Community air services (both 
scheduled and non -scheduled), by  making licens-
ing  procedures  more  flexible  and  by  widening 
their scope  of application; 
- harmonizing  the conditions  of competition; 
- facilitating  the  pooling  of aircraft  and  crews 
and the mutual acceptance of appropriate techni-
cal  standards,  with  the  intention  of optimizing 
utilization of flight  equipment, which would lead 
to considerable  operating  economies,  and  would 
improve  professional  mobilitv; 
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- strengthening  cooperation  with  international 
organizations  (particularly  the  European  Civil 
Aviation  Commission,  ECAC)  in  both  technical 
and  commercial  fields,  as  well  as  safety,  taking 
into  account  Community  problems; 
- encouraging by  means foreseen  mainly in  the 
framework of regional  policy, the creation of cer-
tain air services outside the usual  main axes, pro-
vided  the  public  interest  in  developing  the 
regions  warrants  such  services. 
All  this  would  have  a  major  impact  in  creating 
an  economic  environment  favourable  for  har-
monizing those parameters  which  are  fundamen-
tal  to rpute structures (frequencies, routes, size of 
aircraft)  and  which  also  condition  the· choice  of 
aircraft. 
In  the framework of a common policy evolved in 
this way, which  would  allow  the  airlines  particu-
larly  to  take  part  in  jointly defining  a  European 
aircraft  programme, and  thus becoming  a  neces-
sary  and  valuable  partner  of the  manufacturing 
industry,  the  most  favourable  conditions  would 
be  created  for  bringing about  a common  interest 
between  the  European  airlines,  who  must  be 
competitive  at  world  level  and  a  European 
industry capable of supplying advanced and com-
petitive  products. 
The military market 
The  military  market  accounts  for  62 %  of the 
European  aircraft  industry's  sales  and  is  very 
important to  it; the way  in which  it  is  organized 
is  even  more directly  dependent on government 
policies. 
Despite the efforts  made in the  1960s  with  bila-
teral  and  trilateral  collaborative  projects,  the 
European  aircraft  industry  is  still  deeply  divided 
on  military  aircraft  construction,  which  reduces 
its  production runs and weakens it  relative to  its 
world competitors (e.g.  France's absence from  the 
MRCA  group). 
Duplication  of national  projects  and  the  multi-
plied costs of providing logistic support and sepa-
rate  spares  systems  all  cause  poor  utilization  of 
I  Report  of Cases  before  the Court  1974,  p. 359. 
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advanced-technology  military  equipment  (for 
example,  electronic  equipments)  have  adverse 
operational  effects  (for  instance,  because  of the 
great  variety  of types  of aircraft,  each  of them 
with their own ground servicing and spares facil-
ities,  each  type  of  advanced  aircraft  can  only 
operate  effectively  from  a  limited  number  of 
NATO airfields). Though the short-term interests 
of American arms suppliers may benefit from  the 
divisions of Europe, which have enabled them to 
win  contracts  like  that  for  the  F 16  which  has 
been  bought  by  four  European  countries,  the 
Americans'  long-term  interests,  like  those  of 
Europe,  lie  in  the  establishment  of a  coherent 
European  weapons'  procurement  system  which 
will  enable  European  industry  to  make  a  more 
economic contribution to the joint defence effort. 
Any  policy  designed  to  strengthen  and  develop 
the aircraft  industry  must therefore include_ com-
mon  action  in  the  defence  equipment  field.  To 
this end the Governments of the Member States 
should decide to create a joint arms procurement 
agency  for  airborne  weapon  systems  (aircraft, 
missiles, etc.) to  be  responsible for joint develop-
ment and purchasing of airborne weaponry to meet 
the needs  of the  European  armed  forces.  It  coul~ 
be an ad hoc body working in liaison, as appropriate, 
with  the  competent  national  ministries  and  in 
close  cooperation  with  the  Commission  which 
would  thus  be  provided  with  all  the  necessary 
data  to  manage  the  policy  for  the  aircraft 
industry.  This  agency  will  obviously  not  reduce 
the freedom  of decision  of the Member States  in 
matters  of defence  policy  and  will  not  interfere 
with  existing  international  commitments.  The 
agency  would  become  an  organ  of  European 
Union once this  takes shape.  The opportunity to 
extend the scope of this  body  to other sectors of 
the  arms  industry  will  clearly  have  to  be  eva-
luated  by  the Member States  in  the light  of the 
needs. 
The agency  should,  in  particular, 
- coordinate  the  requirements  of European  air 
forces  so  that  they  consistently  standardize  on 
existing  European  military  aircraft  for  similar 
missions.  This  would  apply  initially  to  combat 
aircraft  (MRCA,  Fl  Harrier,  Jaguar),  subse-
quently  to  other  miliary  aircraft; 
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- identify  common  future  needs  necessitating 
new  joint programmes (including  if necessary,  a 
European future combat aircraft) and promote the 
establishment  of consortia  comprising  the  chief 
European  manufacturers  of military  aircraft,  to 
develop  such  aircraft  in  economic  conditions. 
A  European  policy  for  the  procurement  of air-
borne  weaponry  would  have  to  be  accompanied 
by  discussions with the United States on mutual 
arms sales and collaboration in  weapons develop-
ment. Such discussions might have the following 
aims: 
- mutual  opening-up  of markets,  i.e.,  a  move 
beyond the production under licence of American 
equipment  in  Europe,  and  of European  equip-
ment in the United States towards a big  and bal-
anced  development  of  two-way  transatlantic 
trade,  resulting  in  large  economies  of scale; 1 
- to  ensure that Europe will  be  involved in the 
development  not  of  every  product  but  in  all 
major  sectors  of technology. 
I  An  example of such  an  agreement  is  the series  of agree-
ments  between  Canada  and  the  United  States,  the  first  of 
which  was  signed  in  1941,  which  opened  up  the markets of 
the two countries on a reciprocal basis but subject to the prin-
ciple  that  trade  should  balance  over  the  years. 
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aircraft  industry 
If the  Community's aircraft  industry  is  to  have 
any  future,  we  must  go  beyond  the  stage  of 
intergovernmental cooperation  between differing, 
and  still  national,  aerospace  policies. 
To  this  end, sponsorship of the aircraft  industry 
should  be  exercised  by  the  Community. 
The eventual  framework  for  the management of 
the Community's policy  for  the aircraft  industry 
should  be  that  to  which  the  Community  is 
already  accustomed:  namely  that,  acting  on  a 
proposal  from  the  Commission,  after  consulting 
the  European  Parliament,  the  Council  would 
make the major policy  decisions on programmes, 
Community  financing  and  international  agree-
ment in  this sector.  On the basis  of these deci-
sions, the Commission would assume the neces-
sary  management of the common aerospace  pol-
icy,  and would  take the  necessary  steps to  con-
sult  users,  producers,  trade  unions  and  national 
authorities. 
The  Commission  would  organize  the  manage-
ment of the  aircraft  policy  in  such  a  way  as  to 
use to  the maximum existing  national  structures 
and to seek the greatest possible decentralization. 
Community financing of the aircraft policy would 
not  be  superimposed  on  national  financing  but 
would  replace  it  as  the  policy  is  implemented. 
The  rules  of financial  management  would  have 
to  take  such  a  form  as  to  guarantee, first,  that 
the  multiannual  decisions  taken  by  the  Council 
reflect  the real  scale of the common programme 
and second, that the Commission, responsible for 
management, can raise funds on the capital  mar-
ket  and  undertake  the  expenditure  necessary  to 
implement  the  programme  in  practice. 
This  policy  will  include,  in  particular: 
- bringing  all  large  civil  transport  aircraft  con-
struction  activities  into  a  coherent  programme 
and  optimizing  the use  of resources; 
- close  cooperation  between  industry,  airlines 
and  public  authorities  about  the  decisions 
required  in  executing  the joint  programme; 
- a joint  basic  research  programme; 
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- the establishment of a system of Community 
financing; 
- conduct of relations  with  non-member coun-
tries:  not only  collaboration between Community 
industries  and  those  of other countries, but also 
a commercial strategy for  penetrating export mar-
kets;1 
- harmonization of laws or administrative provi-
sions regarding certificates of airworthiness, noise 
and  other  nuisances  and  standardization  gener-
ally. 
A joint programme 
Action can and  must be  taken  now  to  bring  the 
European aircraft  industry's potential  ihto a joint 
programme on large civil  aircraft to be developed. 
Given  the  competitivity  of European  helicopter 
production,  the  Commission  will  present  appro-
priate  proposals  with  the  aim of ensuring  the 
expansion  of this  sector. 
The programme  for  large  civil  aircraft  should  be 
better  tailored  to  market  requirements,  as 
expressed by  the airlines, than has been the case 
in the past. It should use the Community's capa-
bilities  to  the  full.  It  would  be  based  first  on 
those  developments  of  existing  projects  best 
suited to market needs and on a very small num-
ber of new  projects as  soon as  commercial  requi-
rements emerge.2 
From the American example we  can observe the 
importance  of support  for  basic  technology  pro-
vided  by  US  military  and  NASA  programmes. 
The European programme of commercial projects 
must therefore be  backed by  a Community basic 
research  and  technology  programme,  which 
should coordinate  national  research  projects  and 
l  The  Council  has  already  defined  the  Community's  posi-
tion  in  the  negotiations  in  the  GATT on  reciprocal  abolition 
of customs duties on aircraft over 15 000 kg,  their spare parts 
and  power  plants. 
2  The main criteria of this  programme, which  are  based  on 
information  supplied  by  the  aircraft  industry  through  its 
European association, AECMA, can be  found  in  Annex II.  It 
should be mentioned here that, for  the first  time, the state of 
the  market  and  the  gravity  of the  industrial  situation,  have 
produced a broad consensus of agreement between the aircraft 
industry  and  the  Commission  on  the  necessity  for  such  a 
realistic  programme. 
II develop  a  limited  number of sizeable  joint  pro-
grammes to provide the industry with new  tech-
nologies, as  the building blocks necessary to give 
future aircraft enhanced performance.1 
Such  a  programme should promote a permanent 
industrial structure, at least for large civil  aircraft, 
particularly in sales  and after-sales  service, based 
on experience in cooperation so far; this will ena-
ble the European aircraft industry to increase pro-
ductivity and thus reap the full  benefit of ration-
alization.2 
The first  decision  which  the Council  is  asked to 
take  on the basis  of the Commission's  proposal 
attached to this  report, concerns  the adoption of 
the principle of a European programme backed by 
joint  financing.  This  European  programme 
should  be  prepared  together  with  the  manufac-
turers  and  the airlines  of the  Community. 
It should be  noted that in the aircraft  industry a 
special  relationship  exists  between  governments 
and  industrial  enterprise.  Although  a  substantial 
part of this industry is  publicly owned in  Europe, 
it  remains essential for  it  to retain the prime res-
ponsibility  for  identifying  likely  commercial 
opportunities  and  for  risking  and  managing  the 
resources  needed  to  exploit  them.  Community 
action  should  be  of the  nature  of support  and 
encouragement for  the manufacturers themselves 
to  initiate  commercially  viable  programmes  with 
the aim  of creating  in  the  1980s  a  truly  compe-
titive industry capable of financing a large part of 
its  development  by  itself. 
Community financing 
The execution of the common programme will be 
supported by  Community financing.  This should 
progressively  replace  national  financing  making 
use  of  transitional  measures.  Far  from  raising 
total  expenditure  by  national  and  Community 
authorities, this will  relieve the burden. For, with 
national funding disappearing, Community fund-
ing  should help  to avoid duplication and failures 
experienced  up  to  now,  and  Community financ-
ing  would  cataly.se  the  rationalization  process 
which  is  its  main  aim. 
The Community's existing  financial  instruments 
will  be used and others created if necessary.  3 
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Sales  to  non-member  countries  should  be 
financed  by  an export  credit system.  This func-
tion could be served by a European Export Bank, 
should one be created.4 
External relations 
The  concentration  of responsibilities  for  aircraft 
policy at Community level  will enable it to speak 
with one voice in  its relations with the rest of the 
world.  These relations will  include industrial coo-
peration  with  partners  outside  the  Community, 
commercial policy for penetrating export markets, 
and negotiations  with  third  countries on civil  air 
transport  policy. 
At industrial level permanent and organic cooper-
ative links should be envisaged with the industry 
of other European  countries. 
With regard  to  other countries outside the Com-
munity, the Community should develop a policy 
in  the commercial and industrial field,  which will 
consist sometimes in  seeking unfilled gaps in the 
market, sometimes  in  meeting competitors  head 
on,  or  again  in  seeking  collaboration  on  a  bal-
anced basis.  However, it must ensure in  negotia-
tions with non-member countries that the Com-
munity's interests are  safeguarded and that coo-
peration, like  competition, is  not  a one-way  pro-
cess.  Penetration  of export  markets  will  require 
tariff barriers  to  come down-just as  our compe-
titors are generally able to penetrate the European 
market  because  no  such barriers  surround it. 
In  the  field  of regulation  of air  transport  and 
agreements  on  traffic  rights,  the  Community's 
policy  will  consist  in  exploiting  in  international 
negotiations, its common bargaining power in the 
service  of  European  interest  and  to  optimize 
international  routes  and  services. 
1  The main criteria for the R & D  programme can be found 
in  Annex III. 
2  A  more  detailed  analysis  is  given  in  Annex IV. 
3  The financial instruments envisaged are described in  detail 
in  Annex V. 
4  The Commission sent the Council on 23  July  1975 a com-
munication regarding the creation of a European Export Bank, 
Bull. EC 7/8-1975, point 2309. 
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The Governments of the Community  are  at  the 
crossroads.  If they refuse to  seize the new  oppor-
tunities offered and continue to  pursue divergent 
national  policies, this could  lead  to the disappea-
rance  of  an  autonomous  European  aircraft 
industry,  thus  damaging  the  economic,  political 
and social  future  of the  Community. 
On the other hand, new  opportunities  will  arise 
of attainjng  the objectives  of past  efforts  if gov-
ernments are  prepared  to  progress  beyond  inter-
governmental  cooperation  on  different  but  still 
national  aerospace  policies-a method which  has 
proved  ineffective  and  has  wasted  precious 
years-and  agree  to  the  aircraft  industry  being 
put  under  the  real  and  effective  sponsorship  of 
the Community, which would have the necessary 
means to  implement a common industrial, com-
mercial  and  transport  policy  for  this  sector. 
The five  Annexes which are attached hereto pro-
vide  detailed  information  on different  aspects  of 
the action programme which  is  the object  of this 
document. 
To  launch  this  action  programme,  the  Commis-
sion  is  submitting: 
- to the Council of the European Communities, 
a proposal  for  a Decision concerning  the creation 
of a common policy  in  the civil  aircraft and avia-
tion  sector. 
- to  the  Member  States  of the  Community,  a 
draft  resolution  of  the  Representatives  of  the 
Member States of the European Economic Com-
munity  meeting  within  the  Council  relating  to 
the purchase and development of aircraft weapon 
systems. 
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Annex I 
The situation in the industry 
Introduction 
The current problems in  the European aircraft  manufacturing 
industry stem from two types of factors:  short-term economic 
factors  of a  general  nature  and  structural  factors  specific  to 
the industry,  both  at  the  industrial  level  and  at  the level  of 
government  intervention. 
Short-term economic trends, with the economic recession and 
the rise  in  fuel  prices  have  profoundly affected  this  industry, 
as  can  be seen  from  their repercussions on the market for  air 
transport:  while  between  1959  and  1969  the  market  grew  at 
an  average  rate of growth of approximately  14%, in  the  fol-
lowing  years  the  rate  of growth  fell  to  9%  and  in  1974  to 
3.6 %.  The  airlines,  finding  themselves  over-equipped  and 
with  low  load  factors  have been forced  to slow down their re-
equipment programme and when re-equipping to go for exist-
ing  proved models or improvements on existing models rather 
than  completely  new  types  of  aircraft.  This  unfavourable 
situation  has  affected  the  European  manufacturers  particu-
larly, since it  has coincided with the coming on to  the market 
of their main aircraft  programme (Airbus, Mercure, Concorde, 
F 28, VFW 614) and since the competitivity of their prices has 
been to some extent affected  by  factors  outside their control 
such  as  revaluation of European currencies  in  relation  to  the 
dollar  and  an  inflation  rate  higher  in  Europe  than  in  the 
United  States. 
In this difficult short-term situation, the various limitations of 
the cooperative  formulas  adopted  to  date  and  all  the contra-
dictions  in  the varying  national  policies have been  more acu-
tely  felt,  preventing effective  realization of the very real  tech-
nological  potential  of the  industry  and of the progress  made 
in  European  cooperation  during  the  past  decade. 
That  progress  is  in  many  respects  remarkable.  The  aircraft 
industry, once a  romantic  symbol  of the  nation,  is  probably 
the most  committed of all  industries  to  international  and  in 
particular European collaboration.  Because of the high cost of 
development  and  the  need  to  spread  such  costs  and  gain 
access  to  wider  markets, all  the industries'  most  recent  civil 
developments  (Concorde,  Airbus,  VFW 614,  F 28,  Mercure) 
have involved European collaboration in  one form  or another. 
There  has  been  a  significant  evolution,  moreover,  in  the 
methods of collaboration  from  the worksharing and commit-
tee structures of Concorde for  example to  the more coherent 
Groupement d'lnteret  Economique of Airbus  Industrie.  The 
full  benefit  of these  efforts,  however,  will  not  be  realized 
unless  the  limitations  of  today's  cooperative  methods  are 
understood, the lessons learnt and a new  effort made to build 
on  the foundations  laid. 
13 In  the  area  of intra-Community  cooperation  the  limitations 
have been  felt  at  different  levels.  Programmes carried  out in 
cooperation on a bilateral or a trilateral  basis  have not formed 
part  of a single and coherent  framework.  Each  company  has 
pursued  its  own  interests  in  other  civil  and  military  pro-
grammes which sometimes have put them into a competitive 
situation  vis-a-vis  the same companies  with  whom they  have 
been  cooperating.  The  continuation  of these  differences  or 
opposing interests has resulted in  the fact  that in general coo-
peration has been at the development phase or in  series man-
ufacture  rather than  in  the sales  and  after  sales  phase,  with 
each  cooperating  company  maintaining  its  autonomy  in  its 
commercial  organization, namely sales and after sales service. 
It is  precisely  in  this  field  that  there  is  the greatest  need  for 
genuine  pooling  of existing  capabilities. 
The result  of this  fragmentation  of efforts  in  sales  and  mar-
keting  has  been  that  programmes  have  generally  been 
oriented  towards  production  and  technological  objectives . 
rather  than  towards  marketing  objectives. 
The lack  of an  overall  cooperative framework  which  includes 
civil  and  military  production  prevents the creation of a com-
mon basic  research  programme.  Because they  have wanted to 
maintain commercial competitivity and military independence, 
the  manufacturers  have  often  decided  to  retain  their  own 
research  programmes,  to  develop  the same  expertise  and  to 
create,  with  the backing  of the governmental authorities, the 
same research infrastructure. These shortcomings in  industrial 
cooperation  generally  stem  from  differing  and  contradictory 
national  policies. 
The national  governments  which  retain  large  scale  civil  and 
.military research and development programmes encourage the 
manufacturers  to  cooperate  internationally  in  order  to  share 
costs and risks and sometimes themselves conclude inter-gov-
ernmental  agreements  for  this  purpose. 
Their  policies  however  remain  separate  and  on  an  ad hoc. 
basis  and  have  not  formed  part  of an  overall  strategy.  Gov-
ernmen'tal authorities have not  paid  sufficient attention· to the 
fact that manufacturers have been participating in  civil or mil-
itary  programmes, which  have not  been  coordinated or have 
even  been  in  competition  with  each  other. 
Where  public  funds  have  been  devoted  to  promoting  indus-
trial  cooperation,  the  necessary  joint  support  for  marketing 
the products has  not been  provided:  in  the field  of export cre-
dits  and  insurance the governments  have remained  indepen-
dent, to an extent which  undermines the efforts  made to  sell 
on a world-wide basis those products manufactured in cooper-
ation for  which complex  and often  inadequate solutions  have 
had to be evolved, compared with the competition, which can 
call  on  fast  and  flexible  credit  organizations  such  as  the 
American  Exlm  Bank. 
The governments are in  favour of international cooperation to 
share  the financial  burden  but  they  have  failed  to  avoid  the 
wasting  of Community  resources  in  too  many  programmes 
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which  have had short  manufacturing runs or have even been 
abandoned. 
In order to retain independence in decision-making, they have 
been  very  reluctant  to  delegate  powers  of decision  to  the 
Community, and  even  at  national  level  one  notes  a  certain 
dispersal of powers between manufacturers, air transport com-
panies  and  responsible  ministries. 
The lack  of coordination of airframe and engine  programmes 
has  too often been the result  of decisions  taken  in  response 
to particular situations and  notably for social and employment 
reasons, and of the absence of a financial  policy  concerned to 
take  advantage  of  all  the  benefits  to  be  gained  from  the 
investments  made,  not  only  for  employment  or  industrial 
development, but  also  for  the external  balance of payments. 
During  the  1960's,  even  though  considerable  progress  was 
made in intra-European collaboration, two major opportunities 
were  lost. 
The  first  was  in  the  civil  aircraft  field:  the  Airbus, the only 
major modern technology project  in Europe in  the market for 
medium haul aircraft, was  launched without the participation 
of the British government and with an American engine, even 
though  Hawker  Siddeley  provided  industrial  participation; at 
the  same  time,  the  largest  European  engine  manufacturer, 
Rolls-Royce,  supplied  the  RB 211  engine  for  the  Lockheed 
Tristar.  Thus  a  severe  conflict  of political  and  commercial 
interests divided the European Industry, Airbus with its USA 
CF 6  engine  and  Tristar  with  its  European  RB 211  engine 
competing  throughout  the  world  market,  including  that  of 
British  Airways  itself. 
The  second  was  in  the military  field,  in  the  paralleled  major 
divergence of interests created by  the absence of France from 
the  MRCA  project. 
The cumulative result of these economic and  political  factors 
has  been  to  put  the  European  aeronautical  industry  into an 
extremely  difficult  situation.  The analysis  and  figures  which 
follow l  show  more clearly  the actual  effect of the limitations 
and contradictions which characterize the present state of the 
aeronautical  manufacturing  industry  within  the Community. 
Industrial activity 
Development and manufacturing programmes 
in  the civil aeronautical sector 
A  run down of all  the large  civil jet transport aircraft  which 
have appeared on the western world  market and of the actual 
numbers  produced  shows  the  following: 
1  Which are complementary to or a summary of those which  the Commission 
has  already  provided  in  the  two  documents  'Situation and  figures'  of February 
1975  and  'Demand  prospects  for  civil  transport  aircraft'  of 4  March  1975,  Bull. 
EC 5-1975,  point 2240. 
S.  ll/75 Table  1 - Orders and deliveries  up  to 
31  December 1974 
American  Jet  Aircraft  European  Jet  Aircraft 
Boeing  720  and  707  897  Caravelle 
Boeing  727  1195  BAC  111 
Boeing  747  283  HS  Trident 
Boeing  737  407  vc 10 
DC  8  556 1  Comet 
DC  9  802  Mercure  100 
DC  10  240  Concorde 
Tristar  150  Airbus  A  300 
Convair  83 1  F  28 
VFW  614 
Total  4613  Total 
1  Aircraft  out of production. 
2781 
219 
117 
471 
5]1 
101 
9 
23 
95 
10 
859 
- on the one hand the length of the production  runs of the 
American  aircraft  and  their  in-service  life.  Apart  from  the 
DC 8 and the Convair all  the American jet transports are  still 
in  production thanks to successive developments which  have 
allowed  the fullest  possible  advantage to  be  taken  of the ini-
tial  development  costs  of these  aircraft; 
- and  on  the other hand  the  large  number of programmes 
launched  by  the  European  industry,  sometimes  in  competi-
tion  with  each  other and always  with  production  runs which 
even  under  the  best  assumptions  have  only  just  enabled 
amortization of costs to be achieved. This has been due to the 
fragmentation of sales efforts and to the lack of determination 
to  exploit  to  the  maximum  the  existing  production  pro-
grammes. 
These  figures  show  quite  clearly  how  the  aeronautical 
industry in  Europe (but also  in  certain cases  in  the USA)  has 
too  frequently  wasted  its  resources  in  launching an excessive 
number of programmes:  it  has been  more anxious to  develop 
its  technological  capabilities  and  its  know-how,  which  cer-
tainiy  have  not  been  inferior to  those  in  American  industry, 
than  to  maintain  its  competitivity  by  a  complete  concentra-
tion of effort  in  producing  long  production  runs and  in  dev-
eloping existing  programmes  to  exploit  to  the  full  its  techno-
logical  and  commercial  strengths. 
The effects of such policies  have quite clearly  been felt  in  the 
competitivity of the  European  manufacturers, taking  account 
of the effect of direct labour costs on prices  as  defined by  the 
'learning  curve'.! 
With  regard  to  the  other aeronautical  product,  the  situation 
varies  according  to  the  product: 
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- general  avtatwn  (including  light  turboprops):  The  over-
whelming  superiority  of the  USA  is  best  illustrated by  the 
production  figures  for  1973:  approximately  14 000  aircraft 
were  produced  in  the  USA  compared  to  I 200  aircraft  pro-
duced  in  Europe (of which  350  were  produced  by  a  French 
subsidiary  of an  American  company); 
- commercial  turboprop  aircraft:  In  this  field  the  European 
manufacturers experienced considerable success,  notably  with 
the Fokker F 27  and  the Hawker Siddeley  748,  of which  625 
and  298  have been  sold respectively  up  to  31  December 1974, 
and  which  are  still  in  production,  and  in  the  past  with  the 
Vickers  Viscount, of which  438  were  produced; 
- executive jets: The European  industry  whilst  not  attaining 
the quantity of US  production has shown a remarkable degree 
of competitiveness and dynamism (730 aircraft  have been  pro-
duced  to  date  in  Europe  against  I 300  in  the  USA); 
- helicopters2:  Similar  facto·rs  are  present  "in  this  field: 
whereas  during  the course of the decade  1965-74  the average 
annual  production  was  approximately  2 600  aircraft  in  the 
USA, and 600/650 aircraft  in  the Community, European  pro-
ducts  exhibited  a  remarkable  degree  of competitivity  in  pen-
etrating  world  markets; 
- engines: The engine manufacturers and particularly the UK 
manufacturers  have  produced  programmes  with  long  produc-
tion runs. The SPEY of which  approximately 4 000 have  been 
sold  since  1963  and the  RB 211  of which  430  have been  sold 
since  1971  can  be  compared  with  the  American  equivalents 
(5 000  JT3D, 4 000  JT8D,  I 400  JT9D  and  510  CF 6).  In  the 
same way  the Viper, of which  5 000  have  been  produced, and 
the  Dart  turboprop,  of  which  6 400  have  been  produced. 
represent  important  successes  for  European  industry .3  It  is 
worth  noting  also  the  considerable  success  of  European 
industry  in  the  field  of gas  turbines for  helicopters,  which  is 
a corollary  of the success of the European-produced  helicopt-
ers themselves. On the other hand, prospects  are  more doubt-
ful  for  the two  Anglo-French cooperative projects, the Olym-
pus and  the M 45  H~owing to  the problems  in  launching the 
aircraft  with  which  they  are associated, namely  Concorde and 
the  VFW 614,  and  the  lack  as  yet,  of other  outlets. 
To  this must be  added the fact  that the continually increasing 
cost  of development  together  with  limited  resources  has  led 
the  principal  engine  manufacturers  in  Europe  to  create  co-
operative links with  the two  major manufacturers in the USA 
for  the new  10-ton engines. 
1  The effect of direct  labour cost per unit of production is  defined in  the aeron· 
autical  sector  by  what  is  commonly  called  the  'learning curve':  when  the  pro· 
duction  run  is  doubled,  the average  input of direct  man  hours  is  reduced  by  a 
given coefficient ('learning factor').  In concrete terms this means large  reductions 
in  man  hours per unit of production  in  the early stages of a production run and 
then  a  flattening  out  of the  curve,  which  means  that  the amount of work  per 
unit of production  decreases  less  rapidly. 
Military  and  civil. 
'  These  figures  refer  to  deliveries  made  by  31  December  1974. 
15 Military aircraft 
As  the following  paragraph  shows,  62%  of the  turnover of 
the European  aircraft  industry  is  in  the  military  sector. 
The immense size of development  expenditure and  the  need 
for economies of scale in  production have prompted the dev-
elopment  of a  series  of collaborative  European  projects: 
- Breguet-Atlantic:  Dornier,  MBB  (Germany),  SABCA,  Fai-
rey,  Fabrique  Nationale  (B),  Dassault-Breguet,  Snecma  (F), 
Aeritalia,  Alfa  Romeo,  Fiat  (I),  Fokker-VFW  (Netherlands), 
engines  ~oils-Royce (UK) 
- Alpha  Jet:  Dornier  (Germany),  Dassault-Breguet  (F); 
engines  Snecma/Turbomeca (F) 
- Transa/1:  MBB  VFW-Fokker (Germany), Aerospatiate  (F); 
engines  Rolls-Royce  (UK) 
- Jaguar:  BAC,  (UK),  Dassault-Breguet  (F),  engines  Rolls-
Royce  (UK)  and  Turbomeca (F) 
- M.R.C.A.:  (PANAVIA),  BAC  (UK),  MBB  (Germany), 
Aeritalia  (I),  engines  Turbo  Union  (RR,  MTU,  Fiat),  (UK, 
Germany, I) 
- ~m~l }  helicopters:  Aerospatiale  (F),  Westland  (UK), 
- Laze e  engines  :  Turbomeca/RR (F/UK) 
- ynx 
to  which  must be added  all  the collaborative ventures in  the 
guided  weapons  field. 
As  in  the civil  field,  moreover,  the structures of this collabo-
ration  have  evolved  and  been  most  varied:  from  the  agree-
ment  between  separate  companies  on  the  Transatt,  to  the 
'light'  company  (SEPECAT)  set  up  to  develop  the  Anglo-
French Jaguar, to the common development company set  up 
to  develop  and  produce  the MRCA. 
Yet  this  healthy evolution  has  been  marred  by  weakness:  by 
lack  of systematic collaboration  on  procurement at  European 
level,  by  tack  of pooling  of the  basic  research  infrastructure, 
by  the fact  that  industrial  production  structures and  develop-
ment capabilities  have  not  yet  been  fully  rationalized  to  ren-
der  them  capable  of exploiting  the  European  dimension; 
above all, perhaps by  a failure of basic political strategy during 
the 1960's which  has  meant that in  the key  area of advanced 
combat  aircraft,  major  European  capabilities  are  still  in  ruin-· 
ous competition  with  one  another. 
Europe  of the  1950's  saw  the  re-emergence  of three  major 
poles  of military  aircraft  development:  the  UK  and  France, 
each  with its  indigenous  technology, and the group of coun-
tries  (Germapy,  Italy  and  Benelux) which  combined  together 
to  build  up  licensed  production  of the  Lockheed  104  Star-
fighter. 
When the  time came in  the  1960's  to  consider the  develop-
ment of a joint European successor to  the existing generation 
of jet  combat  aircraft,  negotiations  between  the  UK  and 
France on a possible Anglo-French Variable-Geometry aircraft 
broke  down.  The  UK,  West  Germany  and  Italy  then  com-
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bined  to develop  the  MRCA, which, with  production orders 
of some 800  aircraft,  is  Europe's major current joint military 
project.  The absence of the French  from  the MRCA caused 
a  fundamental  divergence  of interests  within  Europe.  The 
absence of a solidarity of interests has been reflected  in other 
areas:  the development  of two  separate  trainer  aircraft,  the 
Dassault-Dornier  Alpha-Jet  and  the  Hawker-Siddeley  Hawk; 
and the fact  that the jointly developed  Franco-British  Jaguar 
(BAC  and  Dassault-Breguet) has  found  itself in  competition 
with  Dassault's own  F I. 
When  the  time  came  in  1975  for  Belgium  the Netherlands, 
Denmark  and  Norway  to  decide  on a  replacement  for  their 
F 104s,  the choice  of an  American  aircraft  was,  quite  apart 
from  all  technical  and  operational  considerations,. a  logical 
consequence  of  these  divisions  of  interest.  Through  the 
absence  of a  systematic  European  procurement  policy, a  sig-
nificant  market  opportunity  for  European  aircraft  has  been 
lost. 
Like  the civil  industry, the European military aircraft industry 
thus finds  itself in a contradictory position. Its technical com-
petence  is  unquestionable.  European  helicopters,  and  aircraft 
such as  MRCA, the Mirage  family  and the  Harrier, not only 
meet  European  requirements but on occasion  have led  world 
competition.  Yet existing  divisions  mean  that  the  full  econ-
omic  benefits of producing  such aircraft on a European scale 
for  world  markets  have  not  been  realized. 
Turnover 
Taken  overall,  the  turnover  figures  in  the  Community's 
aerospace  sector  have  shown  very  considerable  progress  in 
terms of value expressed  in  current money during the course 
of the last  few  years:  This is  an  increase of 55%  in the EEC 
and  a reduction of 30%  in  the  USA.  Taking  1969  prices and 
exchange  rates,  the  increase  in  the  EEC  is  29%  and  the 
reduction  in  the  United  States  27%.  The  improvement  in 
European turnover figures  is  due to military  sales, to govern-
ment contracts for research and development, and to the sales 
of spares and equipment for civil  aircraft already in service for 
many  years, as  well  as  of engines; so far  it  has  not  been due 
to  substantial sales of new  civil  aircraft.  The fall  in  the turn-
over  figures  for  the  USA  is  mainly  due. to  a  reduction  in 
space  programmes  and  to  a falling  off of the military  effort. 
Calculated  according  to  1969  prices  and  exchange  rates,  the 
progress  of the  European  industry  with  an  average  annual 
increase  of 6.6%,  has  clearly  reduced  the  gap  between  the 
figures  for  European  and  American  industry:  the  turnover 
figures  for  the European industry were equivalent to 16% of 
the  turnover of the American  industry  in  1969,  whereas  by 
1973  this  percentage  had  reached  29%. 
With  regard  to the breakdown of the turnover figures for  the 
aerospace industry within the Community, the main points to 
be  noted  are  as  follows: 
s.  11/75 Table  2 - Turnover in  the aerospace sector 
in million EUR
1 
1969  1970  1971  1972  1973 
EEC  3 856  4039  4 234  5 275  5 990 
United  States.  23 427  22 286  19 663  18 484  16 368 
1  The  values  are  expressed  here  in  EURs,  which  are  the  units  of account  used  in  the  statistical  field  by  the  European  Community  (I u.a.=0.888671 gr  of fine  gold). 
Values  expressed  in  national  currencies  with  floating  exchange  rates  are  calculated  by  the  Statistics  Office of the  European  Communities on  the  basis  of market  rates 
of such  floating  currencies  against  those  currencies  linked  by  the  European  agreement  on  the  narrowing  of  margins.  See  General  Srarisrics  511975,  page 171. 
The scale of  intra-Community industrial cooperation 
Transactions between manufacturing companies  in  the differ-
ent  Member  States  represented  49%  in  1972  and  74%  in 
1973  of  the  overall  value  of  transactions  carried  out  at 
national level while the volume of transactions with aerospace 
companies in non-member countries remained stable in  value 
at  roughly  38 % of the value of transactions carried  out on a 
national  basis  in  1973. 
The scale of  military business 
62.6%  of total  aerosp<:.ce  turnover in  the EEC  is  represented 
by  military  business  as  opposed  to  70.2%  in  the  USA.1 
Table  3 - Breakdown of turnover 
in% 
1 
aircraft'  I engines  J equipment I  space  total 
EEC3  54.2  25.1  17.5  3.2  100 
USA  43.5  13.0  15.3  28.2  100 
1  These  percentages  are  calculated  on  the  basis of average  ligures  for  the  years 
197217 3,  and  relate  to  net  turnover  figures  for  the  Community,  i.e.  excluding all 
transactions  between  aerospace  companies  in  the  Community. 
'  Including  missiles  and  guided  weapons. 
'  The  breakdown  into sub-sectors  for  the  average  of the  years  1972173,  calcu-
lated  from  the  totals  of the  gross  turnover  figures  of the  Member  States  of the 
EEC (i.e.  including all  transactions of aerospace companies  in  the  Community)  is 
as  follows:  aircraft  49.4%, engines  24.6%, equipment 23.3%, space  2. 7%  (N.B. 
The  turnover  for  the  'aircraft'  sub-sector  always  includes  the  value  of engines 
and  equipment  bought  by  the  airframe  manufaCturers  and  thus  understates  the 
relative  contribution  these  sectors  make  to  total  aerospace  industry  turnover). 
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Breakdown· of  turnover between sub-sectors 
In  the Community the small  proportion  represented  by  space 
activities  increases  the  share  of the  other  sub-sectors  com-
pared  with  the  breakdown  for  the  USA  turnover. 
The role of  public contracts in  the EEC and the USA 
To illustrate  the role  of public  contracts, the turnover of the 
entire aerospace  sector, aeronautical  activities  proper (exclud-
ing  space  activities  where  public  contracts account  for  almost 
the  entire  turnover)  and  the  three  aeronautical  sub-sectors 
have  been  broken  down  into  three  sections:  the  State  (civil 
and  military  purchases  and  contracts  for  civil  and  military 
research), the internal civil  market and exports (civil  and mil-
itary). 
Before  examining  in  greater detail  how  intervention  by  gov-
ernmental authorities is  carried out a certain number of obser-
vations can  be  made.  Firstly, the scale  of governmental  sup-
port  in  the USA  (77.1%  of turnover compared  to  59.7%  in 
the  EEC),  mainly  due  to  the  importance  of space  activities 
(28.2 % of turnover  in  the  USA  against  3.2 %  in  the  EEC). 
In  the  field  of aeronautical  activity,  on  the  other  hand,  a 
greater  role  is  played  by  government  contracts,  particularly 
military  ones, in  the  EEC  (58.3%  as  opposed  to  51.5 %),  as 
a simple consequence of the low  proportion of turnover relat-
ing to the internal civil  market (11.4%  as  opposed to 20.9 %). 
Within  the  three  aeronautical  sub-sectors-'aircraft',  'engines' 
and 'equipment' one can see both  the importance of the inter-
nal  civil  market for  'equipment', (the only  one in  which  pub-
lic  intervention  is  less  than  in  the  USA),  and the smallness 
of the internal civil  market for  'aircraft' in  the EEC compared 
to  the  USA  (8.4%  as  opposed  to  19.4 %). 
'  These  percentages  are calculated  on  the  basis of average  figures  for  the  years 
1972/3,  and  relate  to  net  turnover  figures  for  the  Community,  i.e.  excluding all 
transactions  between  aerospace  companies  in  the  Community. 
17 Table 4 - Percentage  of turnover for 
the main customer categories1 
EEC  l 
'Aerospace activities' 
State  59.7 
Internal  civil  market  11.0 
Exports  29.3 
100.0 
'A eronautica/' activity 
State  58.3 
Internal  civil  market  11.4 
Exports  30.3 
100.0 
'Aircraft' 
State  57.7 
Internal  civil  market  8.4 
Exports  33.9 
100.0 
'Engines' 
State  61.3 
Internal  civil  market  9.0 
Exports  29.7 
100.0 
'Equipment ' 
State  56.1 
Internal  civil  market  24.0 
Exports  19.9 
100.0 
USA 
77.1 
9.9 
13.0 
100.0 
51.5 
20.9 
27.6 
100.0 
45.6 
19.4 
35.0 
100.0 
52.3 
23.1 
24.6 
100.0 
67.4 
23.5 
9.0 
100.0 
'  These percentages are calculated on  the  basis  of average  figures  for  the years 
1972/73, and relate  to  net turnover  figures  for  the Community, i.e., excluding all 
transactions  between aerospace  companies  in  the  Community. 
Structure of  public support 
The  way  in  which  the  governments  support  aeronautical 
activities  varies  between  the EEC  and  the  USA. 
Analysis  of government support structure in  the EEC  shows 
the scale  of the support given  for  R & D  in  the engine  and 
aircraft  sectors  in  comparison  with  the  equipment  sector, 
which is supported mainly by  military purchases (Table 6). 
In  the EEC, governments  intervene  m  the civtl  and  military 
sectors  by  purchases  and  R & D  contracts,  whereas  in  the 
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Table 5- Breakdown of  government  support 
by type of  contract 1 
in% 
EEC  I 
USA 
Purchase and maintenance contract 
civil  2.6 
military  57.3  72.8 
R & D contracts 
civil  10.9 
military  29.2  27.2 
100.0  100.0 
Table 6- Breakdown  of  government  support 
by  lype of  contract 1 
in% 
sub-sectors 
'aircraft'  'engines'  'equipment' 
Purchase contracts  56.6  55.6  77.2 
civil  (1.6)  (1.5)  (7.8) 
military  (55.0)  (54.1)  (69.4) 
R & D contracts  43.4  44.4  22.8 
civil  (9.8)  (17.7)  (3.5) 
military  (33.6)  (26. 7)  (19.3) 
USA,  according  to  official  statistics,  the  federal  government 
intervenes  primarily  by  means of military  purchases and  mil-
itary  R & D  contracts. 
In  this context, it  should  be  noted that these military  R & D 
contracts  can  also  assist  the civil  industry  in  that many civil 
programmes stem from  military ones. The best  known exam-
ples of this trend are  the Boeing  707, wllich  derived from  the 
Boeing  military  Tanker;  the  CF 6  engine  derived  from  the 
military  TF 39  engine; the CFM 56  engine derived  from  the 
military GEF 101  engine; the JT 3D engine derived from the 
military T 57  engine.  Moreover, even though official  statistics 
do  not  provide  precise  information on purchases  and  R & D 
contracts  for  civil  aircraft  by  NASA,  various  examples  are 
known, such as  NASA contracts for the civil  QSTOL aircraft, 
the creation  within  NASA of an agency  for  studying aerody-
namic  problems  for  general  aviation  and the contracts let  by 
NASA to General Electric for a QCSHEE engine (Quiet Clean 
Short-Haul Experimental Engine) and to General Electric and 
S.  11/75 Table  7 - Trend in  employment 
1969  1970 
EEC  435 553  438 770 
USA  I 402 000  I  166 000 
Canada  44400  35 800 
Japan  23 100  25 600 
Pratt  and  Whitney  for  engines  for  future  civil  supersonic 
transport  aircraft. 
In fact  military developments  have provided  a  base  for  most 
large scale civil engine projects in  the USA.  Contracts for  the 
advancing  of basic  technology  and  for  providing  demonstra-
tion prototypes have built up a remarkable fund of know-how 
which has enabled American industry to  launch civil  projects 
rapidly as soon as  a market appeared and with very short dev-
elopment  time scales. 
In Europe, on the other hand, the resources committed in  the 
different  countries  have  been  limited  and  the  tendency  has 
been to try  to achieve technological  developments within  the 
framework  of specific  civil  programmes.  This  has even  been 
the case  for  the  main  civil  engine  programmes  such  as  the 
RB 211.  The  lack  of a  military  background  for  civil  engine 
programmes has sometimes led  to  considerable difficulties  at 
the  development  phase. 
The absence of a European basic technology programme com-
parable with, even if less  costly  than, that of NASA and the 
lack of a close link between  the civil  and military  efforts  has 
been  one of the  main  weaknesses of the  European  effort. 
Conclusions 
In  brief, an examination  of the operation of the aeronautical 
sector  from  the  angle  provided  by  the  figures  for  turnover 
shows  up  other weaknesses: 
- the clearly inadequate role played by the internal civil mar-
ket  in  the  aircraft  sector; 
- too  low  a  level  of civil  exports  in  the aircraft  and engine 
sectors; 
- inadequate  support  by  public  authorities  in  R & D  for 
equipment, in  the light of the need to  maintain a competitive 
level  of technology. 
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1971  1972  1973 
422 668  413 021  406 605 
951  000  922 000  948 000 
28 700  28 800  30 200 
26 500  26000  26026 
Public .financing of  R & D 
In absolute value  terms, the total  public  aid  provided  by  the 
States of the Community to civil  aeronautical  R & D {includ-
ing  research  not  conducted  within  the  industry)  was  of the 
order of approximately  two  thousand  million  EURs  for  the 
period of five  years  from  1969  to  1973;  this  figure  represents 
somewhat less  than 4%  of the total of public  R & D  financ-
ing  in the six  countries of the Community which  possess an 
aeronautical  industry  (Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Germany,  the 
Netherlands,  the  UK).l 
Manpower and productivity 
In  1973,  the  aerospace  sector  in  the  enlarged  Community 
employed  406 605  people,  whereas  in  1969  this  figure  was 
435 553.  This  fall  in  the  workforce  of approximately  7%  is 
primarily due to a reduction in  numbers employed within  the 
British  industry  and overall  reflects  an  improvement  in  pro-
ductivity. 
During  thi~ period, the number of jobs in  aerospace activities 
dropped in  the USA by  32.3%, in Canada by  31.9%, but rose 
in  Japan  by  12.6 %. 
The considerable drop in  numbers employed in  the USA  has 
followed  the reduction in  turnover which has previously been 
shown.  Such  manpower elasticity  has  obviously enabled  the 
American  industry  to overcome  the crisis  while  maintaining 
and even  improving  its  productivity  level.  In Europe,  where 
a high  level  of employment is  often considered as one of the 
principal  objectives  of industrial  policy,  it  is  not  possible  to 
adopt policies of structural change which treat employment as 
'  Unfortunately,  the  Commission  does  not  possess  equivalent  statistics  for 
expenditure  on  military  R & D.  However,  expenditure  on  R & D  conducted 
within  the  industry  in  1972  and  1973  is  estimated at  620  million  EUits in  the 
civil  sector  and  1 675  million  EURs  in  the  military  sector. 
19 Table 8 - Trend in  the relative  value of  fleets 
1970 
Community  14.7 
Other Western  European  countries  6.3 
Europe  (21.0) 
USA  63.9 
Rest of the Western World  15.1 
Western  World  100.0 
only one factor  in  the search  for  an overall  balance, a  factor 
which can be adjusted according to cyclical  fluctuations. This 
results  in  a  rigidity  in  employment which, with the frequent 
breaks in production caused by  conversion from military  pro-
duction to civil  production and vice-versa, or from one major 
project to another, has an effect on productivity; and this goes 
to  prove  the fundamental  need  to  programme civil  and  mil-
itary  production  together. 
The  short  production  runs  (an  average  of  100  aircraft  in 
Europe compared  to 500  in  the USA) and  an  internal  distri-
bution of the work  force  in  terms of occupational skill  which 
does not always  reflect  an  optimum structure, together mean 
that productivity (expressed  in  terms of added  value per head 
employed)  in  European  industry  lies  between  one third  and 
two thirds of that of American industry, according to an esti-
mate  made  by  AECMA. 
This estimate confirms  the calculations  made  by  the service 
of the Commission, whose results  (which  were  forwarded  to 
the Council I) are derived from a financial  analysis of a limited 
sample of aerospace  companies  on  the  one  hand  in  Europe 
and on the other in  the  USA.  They show  in  effect  that  the 
added  value  per employee  in  Europe  is  roughly  half that in 
the  USA. 
In  the  past  this productivity  handicap  has  been  partly  offset 
by  the lower wage  levels  in Europe.  However, current trends 
have  made  this  problem  more  acute,  owing  to  the  rise  in 
labour  costs,  which  is  tied  to  inflation,  and  changes  in  the 
parity  of European  currencies  in  relation  to  the dollar. 
The market for civil transport aircraft 
Trend 
The breakdown  by  value of aircraft  fleets  shows  the relative 
importance of the different  markets. 
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1971  1973  1974 
15.4  18.2  17.9 
7.1  8.1  7.8 
(22.5)  (26.3)  (25. 7) 
60.1  53.0  48.0 
17.4  20.7  26.3 
100.0  100.0  100.0 
Table 9 - Trend in  the  European share 
in  the various markets 
1970  1975 
Community  33.0%  21.9% 
Other Western  European 
countries  23.1%  5.8% 
Europe  30.1%  16,9% 
USA  2.1%  0.3% 
Rest of the Western World:  12.2%  12.0% 
Western  World  9.5%  7.9% 
1975 
17.6 
8.0 
(25.6) 
45.8 
28.6 
100.0 
change 
- 11.1 
- 17.3 
-13.2 
- 1.8 
- 0.2 
- 1.6 
Between  1970  and  1973  the  markets of Europe and the Rest 
of the  World  grew  at  the expense  of that of the  USA.  Bet-
ween 1973 and 1975  the share of the market filled by the Rest 
of the WOrld  has continued to expand rapidly and that of the 
USA  to  shriri)<  but  the  European  market  has  stabilized  at 
approximately one quarter of the overall  world market. These 
trends have been particularly noticeable in short and medium 
haul  aircraft:  the share of the  Rest of the World  has  grown 
very  quickly,  the market  in  the  USA  has  decreased  and the 
European  market  remains  stable. 
This general  trend should in  theory  have been  favourable  to 
manufacturers outside  the USA, but the percentages  for  the 
share of European products on the various  markets fell  sub-
stantially  between  1970  and  1975. 
With  regard  to categories  of aircraft,  whilst  the share of the 
European  manufacturers  in  the  market  for  long  haul aircraft 
is  virtually  disappearing (2. 7%  in  1975),  the European share 
in  the  market  for short and  medium  haul aircraft  in  1975  is 
'  Demand  prospects  for  civil  transport  aircraft,  Bull.  EC 5-1975,  point 2240. 
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1975  as  against  11.9%  in  1973.1 
The  net  result  of the growth  in  the  European  air  transport 
market and the reduction in  the share of all  the markets held 
by  the European manufacturing industry has been a  negative 
trade  balance  over  the  period  1968-1973,  amounting  to 
$4 521  million  (1974)  - broken  down  as  $2 695 million  for 
long  haul  aircraft  and  $1 826 million  for  short  and  medium 
haul  aircraft. 
Prospects 
Demand 
Air  traffic  expanded  very  rapidly  during  the  1960s,  with  an 
average  annual growth  rate of 14%  per  year,  but  in  1974  it 
grew by  only 3.6%; this figure  was  regarded  by  many experts 
as  highly  satisfactory  in  view  of their  forecast  for  the  year 
1974  of a  zero growth  rate, which  was  based  on the serious-
ness of the economic crisis and its repercussions on air trans-
port. 
Following  this  slowing  down  of the  growth  rate,  forecasts 
made by  various governmental and private organizations sug-
gest that the next decade will  show a constant growth  but at 
considerably  lower  rates  than  those of the  past. 
In  their studies, the  results of which  have  already  been  for-
warded to the Council,2 the Commission staff have calculated 
two  hypothetical  growth  rates  for  traffic  in  the  period  1973-
1985:  hypothesis A,  for  an  average  annual  growth  rate  of 
6.8%, and a  hypothesis B,  for  a  rate of growth of 9%.3 The 
average annual rates for  the period  1975-1985  would be  7.7% 
under  hypothesis A  and  9.5%  under  hypothesis B. 
Table  10 - Estimates of the value of the civil 
transport aircraft market in the Western 
Worldfor 1975-85 
- mean of hypotheses  A and B 
produced  by  the Commission 
staff 
- mean of the  AECMA hypo-
theses 
-Boeing 
$thousand  of which  long 
million  (74)  haul  aircraft 
49.1 
44 
502 
45% 
60.5% l 
40% 
1  This high  figure  reflects  the  inclusion of long  haul  aircraft used  on short and 
medium  haul  routes. 
'  Reduced  to  $46  thousand  million  in  the  Boeing  estimate of June  1975. 
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Table  11  - The  geographical breakdown 
of  thP  World market 
Rest  of 
Europe  USA  the  World 
- Commission's study 1  30  35  35 
- AECMA 's  forecast 1  22  36  42 
in% 
Total 
100 
100 
'  The  differences  in  the  figures  for  the geographical distribution  of the market 
between Europe and the Rest of the World  mainl'y arise  from  the use of different 
regional  rates  of growth  for  air  traffic. 
AECMA  (Association  Europeenne  de  Constructeurs  de 
Materiel  Aerospatial),  which  analysed  these  results  at  the 
request of the Commission, has arrived at the spread of 7.0% 
and  7.9%  respectively  for  the period  1975-1985.  On the basis 
of these different  hypotheses  for  traffic  growth  and  through 
a  complex  analysis  which  takes  into  account  load  factors, 
seats/km  available,  withdrawal  of  aircraft  in  service,  the 
breakdown by  type of equipment and geographical zone, pro-
ductivity  and  the cost of aircraft,  we  have arrived  at  an esti-
mate  of tke  value  of the  Western  World  market  for  civil 
transport aircraft for the period  1975-1985 (Table 10). 
It  is  estimated  (Table II)  that  the Rest  of  the  World  will 
account  for  around 40%  of the  market, the USA  for  slightly 
more  than  one-third  and  Europe  for  approximately  one-
quarter. 
With  regard  to  long-haul  aircraft  the  Rest  of the World  will 
account  for  more  than  50%  of the market,  Europe  and  the 
USA  sharing  the  remainder  equally.  This  is  a  considerable 
change  compared  with  the  recent  period  (1969-1974),  when 
the  three  geographical  zones  divided  the  market  almost 
equally. 
For short- and medium-haul aircrqfi  the USA  will  account  for 
50%  of the market, with  Europe and the  Rest  of the World 
sharing the remainder more or less equally.  The share of the 
USA  will  remain  the largest  despite a  r~lative drop  from  the 
period  1969-1974. 
1  This  percentage. of 11.9%  is  different  from  the  figure  of 10.1%  which  was 
given  in  the document 'Situation and  figures'. dated February  1975, in  which  tur· 
boprop  aircraft  were  not  included  (see  Bull.  EC 5·1975,  point 2240). 
'  Demand  prospects  for  c1vil  transport  aircraft,  Bull.  EC 5-1975,  point 2240. 
'  The Boeing  company  has  forecast  in  1974,  and  for  the same  period,  rates  of 
growth of 6.8%  and 8.2%; in  1975  Boeing  revised  the rates  downwards to  5.6% 
and  6. 7%.  ICAO on  the  other hand  considered  in  October !974  that there was 
a  strong  likelihood  that  scheduled  world  passenger  air  transpon  traffic  would 
increase  up to  1985  at a 'probable'  average  annual  growth  rate of approximately 
9%. 
21 Table 12  - Estimates of  the balance of  trade in  the aeronautical sector for the period 1975-85 
in $ millions a/ 1974 level 
Hypothesis  I'  Hypothesis  II' 
Commission  AECMA  Commission  AECMA 
Short- and  medium-haul  aircraft  +  19  + 1 964.7  -2  698  - 1 010.0 
Long-haul  aircraft  -986  -2  454.7  -2  708  - 2 914.7 
Total  -967  - 490.0  -5406  - 3 924.7 
'  Hypothesis  I  is  the  result  of a  combination  of high  forecasts  for  traffic  and  market  penetration,  and  hypothesis II  is  the  result  of a combination  of low  forecasts 
for  traffic  market  penetration. 
Supply capacity ol  the European  indusuy 
The supply capacity  of the European  industry  will  obviously 
depend on political and commercial decisions taken in  respect 
of aircraft  programmes. 
However, it has appeared  useful  both to  the Commission staff 
and to  AECMA to take two hypotheses for  European produc-
tion  based  on  theoretical  rates  of penetration  of the  world 
markets.  The  Commission  staff  have  selected  averages  of 
30.4%  and  13.1 %  of the  world  market,  and  the  AECMA 
have taken  averages of 19.4%  and  12.8%  of the world  mar-
ket. 
This  method can be  used to show  the consequences, depend-
ing  on  the  political  and  commercial  decisions  taken,  for  the 
European  balance of trade  in  the sector, taking  into  account 
the  trend  in  demand.  (Table 12). 
It  can  be  seen  therefore  that  under  the  best  hypothesis  the 
balance  will  be  negative  and  in  the  worst  hypothesis  this 
negative  balance  may  well  exceed  five  thousand  million  dol-
lars. 
The table shows that the deficit would be  due primarily to  the 
long-haul aircraft sector. It should be  added that the AECMA 
forecast,  made for  long-haul  aircraft,  assumes  both  the con-
tinuation of Concorde production, and the launching of a new 
200-seat  subsonic  European  long-haul  aircraft  at  the  begin-
ning of the 1980s.  AECMA estimates that  if this  last  aircraft 
is  not produced the overall  negative balance will  increase from 
$490  million  under  hypothesis  I  to  $3 019.6  million,  and 
under hypothesis II from  $3 924.7 mill:on to $5 611.1  million. 
AECMA has  made forecasts  up to  1990;  for  the period  1975-
I990  the  balance  will  be  negative  to  an  amount  of  $12.5 
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thousand million under hypothesis II if no long-haul subsonic 
aircraft  is  produced,  and  will  be  positive  by  $1.63  thousand 
million  under  hypothesis  I  if  new  long-haul  aircraft  are 
launched and  obtain  a  share of the world  market of 14.4%. 
Conclusions 
The  situation  within  the  European  civil  aeronautical  field 
appears  to  be  very  difficult.  Despite  considerable  financial 
support provided  by  certain  Member States, and despite cer-
tain  isolated  attempts  at  cooperation  and  coordination  bet-
ween European partner countries, it  is  clear that national  pol-
icies  pursued to date have proved unable to maintain the mar-
ket share of European industry.  American aircraft  are  tending 
to impose their monopoly on Western markets and are threat-
ening the progressive disappearance of European aircraft from 
the  world  scene. 
This danger has been noted by  the governments of the Mem-
ber States who, in  their Resolution of 4 March  1975,1  decided 
to work together and consult each other on matters of indus-
trial  policy  in  the aeronautical  field. 
It  has  also  been  noted  by  the  manufacturers  who  have 
achieved  a  measure  of progress  towards  rationalizing  their 
efforts: the reorganization of the 'Association Europeenne des 
Constructeurs de Materiel Aerospatial (AECMA)', the creation 
of a  'Group  of Six',  and  collaborative  agreements  between 
European  companies  for  R & D  are all  evidence of this. 
In  effect, the European aircraft  industry, in  the last  15 years, 
has  passed  through its  apprenticeship in  cooperation. To sur-
'  OJ  C 59 of 13.3.1975, Bull.  EC  12-1974, point 2256. 
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jointly  between  industry  and  public  authorities. 
The study of the current operation of this  sector shows  that 
considerable, potential exists which could be  made use of, pro-
vided  that there is  a  change in  political  and commercial  pol-
icies. 
This conclusion  rests  on three  main  factors: 
- The first  stems from  an overall judgment on  the state of 
the Community aerospace sector which cannot be  a  negative 
one. 
Activity  in  this  sector  is  constantly  expanding  (even  when 
calculated at constant prices and exchange rates)  the level  of 
technology is  excellent and the level of know-how and design 
capability  is  certainly  not  inferior  to  that  of  American 
industry. It can therefore be said that the technological  infra-
structure and the human and even financial  resources (taking 
into  account  the  funds  devoted  to  this  sector) are  sufficient 
for  the European industry to  regain  an  important  role  on the 
world market, provided that an effort is  made towards  ration-
alization  of which  it  is  certainly  capable. 
- The  second factor  concerns  the  market  forecasts,  which 
exhibit  a  trend  which  can  be  of great  importance  for  the 
future of the European industry: the growth of the proportion 
of the  market  represented  by  Europe  and  even  more  the 
growth of the market  in  the Rest  of the World, with  a con-
comitant fall  in  the share occupied  by  the American  market. 
If one considers the scale, in  value terms of the world  market 
as  forecast  for  the next  ten years, this trend opens sufficient 
market  prospects  for  a  satisfactory  development  for  the 
industry  to  be  mapped  out. 
- The  third  factor  relates  to  the  structure  of  the  world 
industry which  favours  a major effort  to  maintain activity  by 
the manufacturing industry in  Europe.  Already  in  the market 
for  civil  transport aircraft the USA is  left with only three large 
manufacturers, and of these a single company, Boeing,  holds 
72%  of the world  market for  long  haul  aircraft  and 49%  of 
the market for short and medium haul aircraft.  Moreover, the 
pressure  towards  even  greater  concentration  remains  strong 
within  American industry. The best  guarantee, ensuring that 
European users will  be  able to  make their purchases in  com-
petitive conditions, would  be  the existence of a  viable  Euro-
pean industry capable of developing cooperative ventures with 
other  industries  such  as  those  of Japan  and  the  USA  on  a 
basis  which  is  not  dependent. 
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Annex II 
The establishment of 
a joint programme 
for civil transport aircraft 
In drawing up this plan of action, the Commission sought the 
advice and cooperation of representatives of both the industry 
and  organized  labour. 
Through the medium of its  European  representative associa-
tion,  AECMA,  the  industry  replied  to  a  list  of questions 
drawn  up by  the Commission staff:  it  has given  its views on 
the prospects  for  demand, existing  programmes  which  could 
be expeditiously  developed  to  meet this  demand, future  pro-
grammes,  the  investments  required,  the  possibiJities  of co-
operating on basic research and on questions of structure and 
industrial  productivity. 
The position  of the industry  may  be  summed up as  follows: 
- the airfi·ame constructors agree in  principle that a joint pro-
gramme should be  adopted  and carried  out by  intra-Commu-
nity  cooperation,  whilst  at  the  same time  allowing  a  certain 
amount of competition  in  project design.l  They recognize  the 
need to improve the forms of collaboration by  means of closer 
integration notably in  the area of sales and after-sales support; 
however  they  feel  that  to  achieve  this  a  much  greater drive 
is  necessary  from  the government authorities because of the 
existence of differing national interests in  matters of defence. 
Moreover, they feel  that there are problems of industrial  pro-
ductivity, but that these can be overcome by  rationalizing col-
laboration  arrangements; 
- the  engine  manufacturers  reaffirm  the  need  for  their 
industry to  have access  to a world-wide market, owing to  the 
extremely large  number of units (roughly 3 000) that must be 
produced  before  the  capital  investment  is  amortized.  This 
need  is  behind their policy of collaboration with the American 
industry; 
- the aircra.fi  equipment  manl{{acturers  underline  the  impor-
tance  of  their  activity  within  the  aerospace  industry  and 
would  like  to see a  policy  of encouragement and support  for 
intra-Community collaboration  parallel  to  current or planned 
initiatives  for  the other sub-sectors of the aircraft- industry. 
The labour  representatives  have  made clear  their support for 
the principle of an  integrated common policy  for  the aircraft 
industry, but  they  would  not be  prepared to  accept  the con-
'  The  Italian  industry  feels  however  that  cooperation  outside  Europe,  and  in 
particular with  the  USA, can already, in  certain cases, be beneficial  to the Euro-
pean  industry by  opening to it  a  world-wide  market, but all  the other European 
manufacturers  consider  that  this  viewpoint  is  tenable  only  in- cases  where  co-
operation concerns a  programme aimed at  a  market not covered by  a competing 
European  project. 
23 Table  13  - Estimate of  the value of 
European production 
(in  S millions at /974 level) 
Markets  Europe  USA  Rest of the  World 
1975-1985  2 073.3  428.9  I 626.9 
1985-1990  2 206.9  536.1  I 575.0 
Total  4 280.2  965.0  3 201.9 
sequences  unless  they  were  associated  with  its· preparation 
and  unless  an  organization  of work  and  a rhythm of produc-
tion  guaranteeing  job stability  could  be  assured.  They  made 
a useful  contribution  towards  a future  study  of the structure 
of labour  in  the  European  industry.  They  urged  the  need  to 
reorganize air transport  in  Europe according  to  criteria reflect-
ing  the  interests  of the  users. 
Market prospects 
The  three  areas  to  be  considered  for  joint  projects  suggested 
by  the analysis presented in  Annex I of this report are the fol-
lowing: 
- the  maintenance of a European  presence  in  the  sector of 
short- and  medium-haul  aircraft  of less  than  100-110  seats; 
- the  search  for  various  solutions  to  enable  the  European 
industry  to  occupy  .a  major  position  in  the  market  for  other 
short- and  medium-haul  aircraft; 
- the need  for  further detailed studies on  the advisability  of 
action  in  the  field  of long-haul  subsonic  aircraft. 
On  this  basis,  and  taking  as  a working  hypothesis  the  dev-
elopment of demand along  lines projected  by  the mean of the 
optimistic  and  pessimistic  forecasts  provided  by  AECMA,  it 
seems  useful  to  explore  assumptions  relating  to  production 
based  on  theoretical  rates  of market  penetration, as  a means 
of obtaining  some  reference  data  for  assessing  specific  pro-
grammes.  Quite  apart  from  market  forecasts  and  given  the 
current  economic  situation,  any  joint  programme  must 
include only  new  versions of existing aircraft or aircraft which 
show a substantial improvement in  direct  operating costs.  The 
analysis  must  be  carried  out for  each  category  of aircraft. 
Short- and medium-haul aircraft 
For these aircraft,  if we  adopt  as  a hypothesis  a market  pen-
etration  of 50%  for  the  European  market,  5%  for  the  USA 
market and 35% for  the Rest of the World,1 we  arrive at  the 
totals  for  European  production  (expressed  in  $  millions  at 
1974  level)  indicated  in  Table 13. 
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Table 14- Breakdown of the  World  market 
by capadty of  short- and medium-haul 
aircra.fi 
Number of seats  per  aircraft 
less  than  1001110  more than 
1  00/llO seats  to  180  180  Total 
Hypothesis  I  5%  60%  35%  100 
Hypothesis  II  10%  35%  55%  100 
The total,  $8 447.1  million  (1974),  represents  in  global  terms 
22.8%  of the world  market  for  short- and  medium-haul  air-
craft. 
This  overall  figure  should  be  subdivided  by  category  of air-
craft  expressed  in  capacity  terms, 
- aircraft  with  less  than  100-110  seats, 
- aircraft with  100-110 to  roughly  180 seats, 
- aircraft  with  a seating  capacity  higher  than  180. 
As  things now  stand, the European industry  is  not in  a posi-
tion  to  attempt  this  breakdown  which  can  be  done  only  at 
Community  level  and  on  the  basis  of tripartite  cooperation 
between  the manufacturing  industry, air  transport  companies 
and  public  authorities. 
However,  the Commission  feels  that  this  analysis  should  be 
made for  illustrative purposes, at least to bring out the themes 
for  future discussions on  civil- and  medium-haul aircraft  pro-
grammes. 
For  this  purpose,  as  a  breakdown  of the  world  market  by 
capacity of short- and  medium-haul aircraft,  both  the current 
breakdown  (I)  and  a  hypothetical  breakdown  (II) of demand 
based  largely  on  market  trends  in  the  United  States, can  be 
used (Table  14). 
Aircrqfi of  less than 100-110 seats 
Taking  the figures  for  market  penetration  rates  given  above, 
assuming  that  these  aircraft  each  cost  $4  million  on  aver-
age,  European  production  for  the  period  1975  to  1990  will 
reach  105  aircraft  under  hypothesis I and  210  aircraft  under 
hypothesis II. 
Bearing  in  mind these theoretical  manufacturing assumptions, 
what  are  the  possibilities  for  the  European  industry? 
'  These percentages are working hypotheses postulated by  the statT of the Com-
mission.  The figures  used  by  AECMA  are  Europe  52.5 %,  the  USA  10%  and 
the  Rest  of the World  30%. 
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important  markets  for  these  aircraft  are  likely  to  be  higher 
than  those  given  on  page  24  and  therefore  European  sales 
could  be  larger.  In  fact,  it  is  foreseeable  that demand for  this 
category  of aircraft  will  absorb  the current  market  for  turbo-
props, with  the result  that  the  figures  above  could  be  consi-
derably  increased. 
Especially  as  for  feeder  aircraft,  certain  European  companies 
already  hold  an  important  position  on  the  world  market,  in 
particular  Fokk'er  with  its  F 27  and  28  and  the  HS 748. 
To meet this prospect, the manufacturers are planning to dev-
elop  a  100-seat  aircraft  based  on  the  F 28  and  using  a  new 
version  of the  Rolls-Royce  Spey  engine,  the  Spey 72.  How-
ever, Rolls-Royce/Snecma will  have to be  given  wider appli-
cations for  their M 45  H engine than are available today, if the 
programme  is  to  be  continued.  In  this  way,  an  F·28  with 
three  M 45 H  engines  has  also  been  considered. 
The VFW 614  could  also  be  further developed as a  function 
of the  increased  thrust  of the  M 45 H  engine. 
The estimated  research  and  development  costs  suggested  by 
the airframe  industry  for  these  programmes  would  be: I 
- airframe  for  the F 28  $93.2  million  (74) 
- Spey  engine  $70.2  million  (74) 
- airframe  for  the  VFW 6!4:  $11.7  million  (74) 
Aircra.fifrom /00-110 to  180 seats 
Taking the  market  penetration  rates  specified,  and  assuming 
that these aircraft each cost $9 million on average, production 
for  the period  1975-90  would  reach  563  aircraft  under hypo-
thesis I  and  328  aircraft  under  hypothesis II. 
Bearing  in  mind these theoretical  assumptions, the European 
industry is  already in  the field  in  this category  with  three air-
craft types-the BAC 111, the Trident and the Mercure. Com-
petition from  the Americans is  represented by  the Boeing 737, 
the Boeing 727, and the DC 9 which cover the complete range 
and  dominate  the  market. 
Before  10-ton engines (CFM 56  from  Snecma/General Electric 
and  the JTIOD from  Pratt  and  Whitney-MTU-Fiat  and  pos-
sibly  from  Rolls-Royce) appear in  1979, some airline compan-
ies,  particularly  European  ones,  will  have  to  obtain  aircraft 
with 120  to !50 seats, which would correspond to the existing 
European types (or their derivatives:  BAC 111-700 or Trident 
3C  for  a  research  and development and airframe tooling cost 
of $95 million and $130 million (1974)  respectively,  provided 
that  appropriate  versions  of the  Spey  engine  are  available). 
Once  the  new  engines  are  on  the  scene,  demand  will  shift 
towards aircraft of !50 to 180 seats, which may be either two-
engined or three-engined aircraft.  The United States  industry 
will  be  represented  by  the  7 X 7  family  of  aeroplanes,  of 
which  the  first  version  will  be  a  three-engined  medium-haul 
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aircraft  whose capacity  is  likely  to exceed  the  upper limit  of 
this  category,  while  the  European  industry  could  be  repre-
sented at  the  lower end of the  range  by  twin-engined  devel-
opments of existing  aircraft. 
The manufacturers have raised  three possibilities for  develop-
ing twin-engine aircraft  using  10-ton engines, based on exist-
ing  aircraft:  the  BAC Ill, the  Mercure and  the Trident.  The 
estimated cost of research  and development and tooling (with 
the  latter being  45-50%  of the  total  in  each  case)  would  be 
the  following: 
-airframe of  the BAC 1/1-800: $235 million (74)- 144  seats, 
- ait:frame  ol the  Mercure:  $228  to  $273  million  (74).  The 
investment could be reduced by  $64 million  by  using the air-
frame  already  available  of the  prototype  02  Mercure.  - 147 
seats,  2 800 km, 
- Trident  airlrame:  $260  million (74)- 142  seats,  2 100 km, 
- CFM 56  engine:  the  European  share (made by  SNECMA 
(F) and Fabrique Nationale (B))  which  is  50% of the total, is 
estimated  at  $270  million  (74), 
- the  JTJOD  engine:  the  manufacturers  have  not  provided 
detailed  information, but the costs are  roughly  equivalent  to 
those  of the  CFM 56. 
Aircra.fi  with  seating capacity in  excess of  180 seats 
Taking  the  market  penetration  hypotheses  and  assuming  an 
average aircraft  price of $17 million, the European production 
for  the  period  1975  to  1990  would  amount  to  174  aircraft 
under  hypothesis I  and  273  aircraft  under  hypothesis II. 
In  respect of these hypothetical market projections, the Euro-
pean  industry  can  offer  in  this  range  the  Airbus A 300,  of 
which  existing  versions  do  not  differ  in  their  capacity  (269 
seats),  but in  their  range  capability  (B2,  short- and  medium-
haul,  84, medium-haul). 
No  clear division exists between  the aircraft  at  the top of the 
range  with  100-110  to  180  seats  and  those at  the bottom of 
the class of aircraft with  more than 180 seats; furthermore an 
as  yet  ill-defined  market  for  aircraft  from  180  to  220 seats is 
emerging. 
The  European  industry  could  offer  a  new  version  of  the 
A 300--the version B 10 with 214 seats, using new generation 
engines,  either  the  Rolls-Royce  RB 211-524,  or the  General 
Electric  CF 6,  or  the Pratt  and  Whitney  JT9D. 
The A 300 B 10  would have an operational  range of 5 300 km 
and would  be  produced by  shortening the fuselage  and mod-
ifying  the empennage.  The cost  of this development, which 
could take approximately  three and a  half years, is  estimated 
'  The comparability of these figures and of the other estimates of costs included 
in  this chapter must be  treated with the utmost caution, bearing in  mind the dif· 
ferent  inethods of estimating  used  by  the  manufacturers. 
25 at  $97.6 million (1974), and if it  was decided to equip this air-
craft  with  RB 211-524,  new  nacelles  would  be  required 
together with  the modification  of certain  systems, which  air-
frame  manufacturers estimate, would cost an  additional  $31.2 
million. 
The launching of the B 10  version (research  and development 
and  tooling)  would  therefore  total  $128.8  million,  which 
represents a fairly  small  investment compared  to  the possibil-
ity, of covering, with  the addition  of this new  version  of the 
Airbus  family  the  whole  range  of markets  referred  to.  It  is 
also  worth  noting  that  this  version  would  have  many  ele-
ments  in  common,  not  only  with  the  8 2 and  8 4 versions, 
but  also  with  the long  haul  version  8 II  which  is  discussed 
later  in· this  paper. 
Conclusions 
Finally, from  this analysis of the short- and  medium-haul air-
craft  markets and  programmes, based  mainly  on data supplied 
by  industry,  the  following  conclusions  can  be  drawn: 
- In  the  class  of  aircraft  below  100-110  seats,  European 
industry  is  already  well  established  on  the  world  market  and 
its  position  could  be  improved  in  the future  by  supporting  a 
development  of the  F 28  (with  a  developed  Spey  engine)  in 
order to  increase its capacity, and by  supporting the continued 
sales  of the  VFW 614. 
- In  the  intermediate  capacity  class  of aircraft  (100-110  to 
180 seats) which today  is  the most important category, Amer-
ican  competition is  already  dominant and  is  likely  to  become 
even  more  so  with  the  development  of its  existing  or  pro-
jected  aircraft. 
Sales  support should be assured  for  existing aircraft (8AC Ill 
475  and  500 at  the lower end of the range and the Trident 3 8 
at  the  upper  end). 
On  the other hand, the information currently available  to  the 
Commission  on  the  projected  aircraft  using  new  10-ton 
engines  or  re-fanned  Spey  engines  does  not  allow  it  at  this 
stage and  in  the absence of a firm  position being taken by  the 
European airlines  to  provide  precise  indications of which  pol-
icies  to  follow. 
It  seems  nevertheless  that  the  solution  to  look  for  will  be 
amongst  the  twin-engined  projects,  carried  out  either  under 
purely  European cooperation  or in  cooperation  with  industry 
in  non-member countries.  A comparative  study of European 
projects  should  therefore  be  made,  as  well  as  very  detailed 
market  surveys. 
At  the same time  the  value  of possible  cooperation  with  the 
Japanese  industry  should  not  be  underestimated,  bearing  in 
mind  the  features  of the  Japanese  market  and  the  attempts 
by  the Japanese to  set  up  balanced  forms  of international  co-
operation. 
Lastly,  the advisability  of collaboration  with  manufacturers  in 
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the USA  should be  considered  from  the point  of view  of the 
links which  already exist in  both  the airframe sector (the Boe-
ing-Aeritalia 7 X 7 agreement) and  the engine sector (collabo-
ration  on  the  10-ton  engines). 
There must be an  overall  agreement with  American  manufac-
turers,  so  that  cooperation  can  take  place  on  the  basis  of 
shared  responsibility  and  without  prejudice  to  independent 
European development of other programmes.  Certain options 
will  have  to  be decided,  and  reciprocal  arrangements  should 
be  asked  of the  American  manufacturers  if transatlantic  col-
laboration  (on  the  7 X 7 for  instance) were  to  harm  the  pros-
pects  of other  European  projects  such  as  the enlargement of 
the  Airbus  family. 
- In  the  high  capacity  aircraft  sector (more  than  180  seats) 
the  first  efforts .should  be  towards  selling  the  A 300 82/84. 
Thereafter  if it  was  decided  to  develop  the  8 10,  one  would 
have  the considerable  advantage  of being  able  to  offer,  with 
the  B II, which  is  discussed  below, a family  of aircraft  based 
on  concrete  results  and  maximized  return  on  investments 
already  made. 
Long-haul aircraft 
The only  current  European  project  is  Concorde.  Any  possible 
scenario  which  one  might  suggest  in  respect of sales  of this 
aircraft  presents grave  difficulties.  However until  furt~.~r mar-
ket  information  which  will  become available  once  the aircraft 
has entered service is  provided, the actual  manufacturers pro-
jections have been  used, i.e.  the scale of 40  to  50  aircraft  bet-
ween  now  and  1990. 
Various  developments  of  the  current  version  are  projected, 
notably  the 8 version  for  an  estimated cost  of $114.5  million 
(1974),  which  involves noise  reduction and  range  increase.  On 
this it  is difficult  to form  opinions until  firmer information on 
prospective  markets  can  be  obtained. 
For future  projects,  market  projections  have  indicated a need, 
by  1981,  for  a  200  seat  long-haul  aircraft  for  airlines  not 
requiring  aircraft  as  large  as  the Boeing 747,  the DC 10-30/40 
and  the  long-range  version  of the  Lockheed  Tristar,  taking 
into  account  the  need  to  replace  the  Boeing 707  and  DC 8, 
and  the distribution  of the  long-haul  market, of which  75% 
will  be  outside the  USA.  This aircraft  would  be  a version de-
rived  from  the  Airbus A 300 (A 300  8 II), with  four  new  lO-
tan  engines,  with  a  capacity  of 214  seats  for  a  range  of 
II 800 km. 
Estimated investment costs for  research  and  development and 
tooling for  the A 300 8 II  would  be  $833  million (1974).· This 
long-range version of the Airbus would  use  the B 10  fuselage, 
and  modified  or  new  wings.  It  would  still  have  many  ele-
ments  in  common  with  the  B 2 and  8 4  version. 
Market  prospects,  the use of a basic  module  in  different  ver-
sions and the resulting possibility of.offering customers a' long 
S.  11/75 range version  of a  family  of aircraft  are  arguments in  favour 
of this  development. 
Assuming  ~ production rate of two  aircraft per month for  the 
first  five  years and three aircraft  per month  for the following 
five  years,  we arrive  at  a  total  sales  figure  of $4 675  million 
(1974)  for  275  aircraft. 
Adding  the Concorde sales  projected  above,  we  reach  a  total 
of $6 070  million  (1974),  representing  12%  of the long-haul 
western world market for the years  1975-90.  Such an objective 
should  not  be  beyond  the  capabilities  of  the  European 
industry. 
Another solution suggested by  the manufacturers would be to 
launch  a  completely  new  narrow-bodied  long  range  aircraft, 
which would also use four new  I 0-ton engines with a payload 
and range capability of 190/225 seats over 10112 000 km. This 
aircraft, for  which development costs are  estimated at  $1  041 
million (1974) could in  theory form  the basis  for  a new  family 
of aircraft, with  a  riew  short- and  medium-haul twin-engined 
aircraft,  if construction  of the  latter  was  decided  on. 
On the basis of the  foregoing,  the  following  conclusions can 
be drawn: for Concorde, before a policy can be suggested, the 
impact  of entry  into  service  on  market  prospects  must  be 
known;  for  subsonic  long-range  aircraft,  the  A 300 B II 
appears  the  most  suitable solution. 
Production of aircraft equipment 
The  creation  of a  joint  programme  will  have  direct  conse-
quences on the development of industrial activity  in  the sub-
sector  of on-board  equipment.  This  is  a  high  technology 
industry,  sufficiently  competitive  to  maintain  substantial 
experts,  and  it  is  characterized  by  a  large  number  of com-
panies. 
Intra-Community  cooperation  for  the  production  of certain 
systems and sub-systems designed  for  aircraft  which  are  part 
of the joint development programme should be  promoted and 
supported  by  research  and development  contracts;  this  could 
be of considerable  benefit  to  the joint  programme, since the 
cost of on-board systems accounts for about 30% of the price 
of an  aircraft. 
As  areas  for  joint  action,  the  industry  has  suggested  flight 
control systems, navigation systems, and, in  the broader field 
of  electronic  equipment,  advanced  technology  applications 
using digital  techniques.  Further proposals are being  prepared 
by  representatives  of this  sub-sector. 
Steps towards overall agreement on a joint programme 
Six  basic  principles  should  be  borne  in  mind  in  reaching  an 
overall  agreement  for  a  joint  programme: 
- the whole spectrum of industrial effort  in  the construction 
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of large civil  transport aircraft (airframes and motors) must be 
covered  by  the overall  framework  of the  joint  programme, 
including  both  the  projects  which  are  exclusively  European 
and those which are carried out in  cooperation with  manufac-
turers  in  non-member countries; 
- at  the industrial  level,  the work  should  be  shared out on 
as  balanced  a  basis  as  possible,  in  order to  make  use of the 
capabilities  and  potential  of each  partner; 
- the  work  should  be  shared  out  with  due  regard  for  the 
time scale:  necessary to carry out the joint programme, in  such 
a way  as  to ensure that each partner has a balanced work load 
for  the whole  period  in  question; 
- a joint civil aircraft programme would have very important 
consequences  for  the engine sector:  with  wider sales  outlets, 
this sector would  more easily  preserve  its  technological  inde-
pendence, which  might well  be jeopardized  if it  is  too heavily 
dependent  on  the  American  industry.  The  'airframe'  and 
'engine' subsectors are  so closely  connected that  one will  not 
survive  without  the other; 
- the impact of such a programme on  the 'equipment' sub-
sector  should  be  studied  with  a  view  to  promoting  suitable 
cooperation  arrangements  for  developing certain  systems and 
sub-systems  for  aircraft  and  engines  constructed  under  the 
joint  programme; 
- in  view  of the  close  industrial  connection  between  civil 
and  military  activities,  it  would  be  much  easier  to  arrive  at 
the  balance  referred  to  above  if parallel  progress  could  be 
made  in  military  aircraft  manufacture. 
Participation of the airlines in  the establishment 
of the joint programme 
In  the  past  European  airlines  have  been  unwilling  to  limit 
their freedom  of action  by  making  advance commitments to 
buy  European  aircraft.  Yet  they  do  have  an  interest  in  the 
survival  and  development  of a  strong  and  viable  European 
aircraft  industry.  The  existence  of  a  strong  indigenous 
industry  guards  them  against  the  emergence  of  monopoly 
situations  in  the  future,  and  against  the  harmful  impact  of 
any  major  technical  failures  in  such  a  situation. 
In the view  of the Commission  it  is  in  the interest of the air-
lines and of the Member States of the Community to develop 
a  relationship  of  understanding  and  partnership  with  the 
European aircraft industry, much on the Jines  of the relation-
ship  that  exists  between  airlines  in  the  USA  and  the  US 
industry. 
Such  a  relationship  has  two  elements: 
- First,  if  such  European  programmes  are  to  be  launched, 
they must be  based on a systematic analysis and  presentation 
by  the  airlines  of  their  needs  in  the  form  of a  common 
requirement.  It is  a task  which  needs  to  be  carried out both 
through direct contacts between  the airlines and industry and 
27 through a systematic input of airline views in  the detailed ela-
boration  of the  programme. 
- Second, just as  in  the  United States, aircraft are  launched 
against  orders by  major US  airlines,  so  in  Europe,  if compe-
titive  and economic  products  are  designed  as  they  can  be,  it 
would  be  natural and proper for  them to  be launched against 
firm  orders  by  the  major  European  airlines. 
In  the past a  major cause of the reluctance of the airlines to 
make  such  commitments to  the European industry  has  been 
a  lack  of confidence  in  its  permanence.  A  long-term- overall 
programme  backed  by  the governments  of the  Community 
and  industry,  together  with  firm  commercial  and  financial 
commitments. to  develop  and  sustain  the  after-sales  service 
and  the  product  range  corresponding  to  the  airlines'  needs 
would  surely  provide  that  credibility. 
Technical harmonization 
Common airworthiness certification 
Work already carried out by  industry with a view to the adop-
tion  by  every  national  authority of the Community of com-
mon standards for airworthiness certification makes it  possible 
to  look  forward  to  the  following  results: 
- the presentation to the Council of a directive establishing 
within  the  EEC common  standards  for  airworthiness  certifi-
cation, 
- the creation of a European office  for  airworthiness certifi-
cation. The Commission considers such an organization to be 
necessary  primarily to give  the users  and the public  authori-
ties a full  guarantee as  to  the homogeneous and reliable appli-
cation  of European  certification  regulations.  The Council  of 
the Western European Union has already  approved  this  pro-
posal  in  principle. 
Common cerfification in  respect 
qf  nuisance reduction 
Current discussions between the Commission and the Mem-
ber States aiming at  the adoption  by  every  national  authority 
in  the Community of common standards  and  procedures  for 
aircraft  noise  reduction  should  shortly  lead  to the issue of a 
Community  Directive  which  will  mainly  echo  the  require-
ments of Annex 16 of the International Civil  Aviation Organ-
ization's (ICAO)  Chicago  Convention. 
Establishment qf  norms 
AECMA  has  worked  for  several  years  on  normalizatio~. 
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As  the  Commission  stressed  in  its  Communication  to  the 
Council  in  1972,1 the current state of progress. of this  work 
now  makes  it  possible  to  consider  whether  some  of these 
norms  should  be  embodied  in  Community  Directives. 
'  Bull.  EC  9-1972,  Part  I,  Chapter  2. 
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A Community programme 
for basic research 
and technological development 
Technological objectives 
The aircraft  industry,  both civil  and  military,  makes  use of 
many ad'tanced technologies. The competitiveness of the pro-
ducts  therefore  depends  on  substantial  programmes  of 
research  anc!  of basic  technology. 
In  most  cases  there  exists  a  logical  relationship  between 
research for  military  purposes and research  for civil  purposes. 
One could say that the military sector  is  concerned primarily 
to  improv·e  operational  performance, whereas  the civil  sector 
seeks  primarily  to achieve economic operation. 
There is, then, a close interlinking between civil  and military 
interests in any research  programme, particularly for the long 
term. It follows  that a joint aeronautical  research  programme 
which  did not distinguish  between civil  and military  applica-
tions could optimize the parameters of cost, benefit and effi-
ciency.  The  role  which  the  Community  might  play  herein, 
through the adoption of a joint common programme in  basic 
aeronautical  research,  financed  from  Community  budget 
funds, would be similar in  nature to that played by  NASA in 
the  USA.  Such  a  programme  therefore  could  be  realized  in 
different forms according to the subject of the research; some-
times  this  could mean contracts placed  with  individual  com-
panies  on condition  that  results  would  be  made available  to 
the entire Community aeronautical industry; or it could mean 
contracts  placed  with  groups or consortia of companies  who 
would be committed to common developments (for example, 
in  the  field  of equipment). 
The  competitiveness  of European  products  depends  on  the 
quality  of their technology.  It is  therefore  a  matter of high 
priority to create conditions to enable basic  research and tech-
nological  programmes  to  be  optimized,  and  these  can  be 
classed  in  three  categories,  according  to  their  time scale: 
Short-term applications which require improvements and extensions 
to existing technologies with the aim a.! improving specifically defined 
products,  whether aircra.fi or components 
In this category, the purpose of research is  to  upgrade current 
generation  aircraft  according  to economic criteria  and with  a 
view  to reducing nuisance problems, and  to  create  new  ver-
sions derived from  these according  to  the needs  of the  mar-
ket. 
Both  these  two  cases  involve  specific  industrial  programmes 
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where  extstmg  technology  is  applied  to  existing  or  derived 
products. 
Medium-term applications,  the objectives 
for which  will depend on  market trends 
In the medium-term, it  is  important for the industry to build 
up a  capital  stock  of key  technology, even  when  users  have 
not  identified  their exact  needs, so that competitive commer-
cial  products  can  be  launched  when  requirements  crystalize. 
The  technologically  critical  areas  must  firs!  be  defined  and 
then the building blocks  identified, pending an express state-
ment of requirements  by  the  users. 
Work  in  this  case  is  therefore  oriented  towards  the  next 
decade.  Its  objective  is  to  enable the  indu'ltry  to  launch  air-
craft  onto the  market  at  competitive sales  prices,  but  which 
will  also  incorporate  substantial  improvement  in  direct  oper-
ating  costs  and  nuisance  reduction.  These  aircraft  will  call 
upon  new  technologies  and  probably  on  derived  versions  of 
existing  engines  or  engines  under development. 
This  type  of Community  programme  for  research  and  basic 
technology should be structured in  several  phases:  firstly, the 
collation  and  analysis,  at  Community  level, of national  esti-
mates made by  governmental organizations and by  the manu-
facturers  covering passenger and  freight  demand and the air-
craft designs which might meet requirements in  the period  in 
question. 
These aircraft could be  either advanced versions derived from 
current civil  aircraft  or  new  generation  aircraft. 
Various options might be  decided, and would be the basis  for 
identifying  technologies  to  be  developed. 
A. research  programme  would  then  be  mapped  out  on  the 
basis of the cost-benefit asessments of the most suitable dev-
elopment  projects. 
Long-term applications for  which  the procedure  described above 
shoud be reversed: currem scientific and technofogical evaluations 
which  will suggest long-term trends 
These  will  be  basic  research  or  feasibility  studies:  they  are 
subject to a considerable risk  in economic terms, since success 
in  a  research  project  does  not  necessarily  lead  to  application. 
The greater part  of this  work  is  basic  research  largely  carried 
out by  research  centres (universities,  national  bodies, etc.) at 
a national level; this obviously leads to overlapping and there-
fore  wastage  of effort  and  resources. 
Certain bilateral and trilateral  arrangements exist in this field 
but  in  the  framework  of the  Community  programme,  it  i~ 
clearly necessary to go further and combine infrastructure and 
techniCal expertise and to set up centres of advanced research 
in  the various  field  under consideration. 
29 Infrastructure 
In  the  field  of research  tools,  national  considerations  have 
sometimes led  to the costly duplication of installations and to 
an  inefficient  use  of national  resources. 
The setting up of centres of advanced research  in a Commu-
nity  framework  should  improve this situation. The coordina-
tion  which  is  implicit  will  lead  to  an  optimized  use of the 
European  resources. 
Moreover,  certain  installations  are  still  lacking  in  Europe, 
since  their  cost  is  generally  beyond  the  capacity  of national 
budgets.  It may  well  be  possible  to  establish  these within  a 
Community  programme,  if a  need  is  identified: 
- large  transsonic  wind  tunnel, 
- flying  test  beds  (wings,  materials,  equipment), 
- titanium  foundry, 
- Data  processing  (structures,  aerodynamics). 
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Annex IV 
Structures, employment and 
productivity 
Objectives 
The  industrial  structure  necessary  to  carry  out  a  JOtnt  civil. 
aeronautical  manufacturing  programme should  meet  the  fol-
lowing  objectives: 
Basic research 
Several  research  and  design  centres can  operate at  the same 
time, so long as  research  is  programmed on a European basis 
and provided that in  this particular context the independence 
of each  company  whilst  continuing to  provide stimuli,  does 
not  have  adverse  effects  on  the  efficiency  and  the  rational 
organization  of the overall  effort. 
Research-development and production 
Responsibility and risks should be  shared among the different 
companies in  such a  way  as  to minimize the additional costs 
which result from problems of coordination, management and 
often  overlapping of work. 
Sales and after-sales 
Relations  with  the customer, and  with  the banks and  public 
authorities which are involved in supporting sales, require fin-
ished  products  to  be  marketed  by  a  body  capable of offering 
full  guarantees throughout the  period of use and credible as 
a  potential  supplier serving  the  user's  future  requirements. 
Current methods 
Various  forms  are  in  use and  none  fulfils  all  the objectives 
set  out  above,  even  though  considerable  progress  had  been 
made  towards  them. 
Appointment of  a company as a prime contraCtor 
This formula involves the least amount of cooperation and is 
preferred when a single company can take overall  responsibil-
ity  for  the programme (for example, Dassault in  the Mercure 
project). 
The problems  lie  in  the difficulty of extending the system to 
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programmes. 
Certain tasks carried out by both companies 
This solution  has  been  adopted  in  the Concorde  programme 
in the area of assembly and sales. It presents several  problems 
at  the production stage, for  it  does  not allow  full  rationaliza-
tion  of production,  nor  does  it  allow  full  advantage  to  be 
taken of the benefits of the learning curve; furthermore, it  is 
difficult  to  coordinate sales  and  marketing  strategies. 
Tran~fer qf  certain responsibiliries to  a single company or mulrina-
tional grouping,  taking responsibiliry.for a single l!rojecr (for exam-
ple,  Airbus lndustrie,  Panavia,  ere.) 
This  is  the  formula  which  has  been  most  often  used;  it 
embodies  the advantages  of a  central  management  and  can 
bring  about  a  more complete  integration at  the development 
and  production  stages,  but  certain  problems  remain,  at  the 
sales  and  after-sales  level,  owing  to  the  difficulty  for  such 
organizations to build  up a reputation of stability and reliabil-
ity. 
Possible solutions 
The solution which  takes the form  of a complete  merging of 
companies to create one or two large manufacturers in  Europe 
has seemed attractive, but has so far  proved unfeasible, owing 
to  insurmountable  political,  legal  and  tax  problems. 
Experience  suggests  that  the  route  to  follow  is,  first,  to  fix 
common  objectives,  then  to  find  functional  solutions  for 
attaining  them  most  fittingly  and  efficiently,  without,  how-
ever, calling in question the existence of the companies them-
selves. 
In  the field of large civil transport aircraft, the jimctions which 
must  be  performed  in  common  (by  an  integrated  industrial 
organization  at  the European  level,  perhaps  on  the model  of 
Airbus Industrie or through a joint subsidiary), are as  follows: 
- marketing,  sales  and  after-sales  support; 
- the definition of an overall strategy concerning future pro-
ducts and the organization of production in  the medium- and 
long-term; 
---:  Coordination  and  planning of basic  research. 
These  three  functions  together  make  up  a  coherent  frame-
work which would allow for  example the feedback  of market-
ing information into the planning of research so that the latter 
can  be  based  on  the indicated  needs  of the  market. 
Such  a  central  industrial organization  involving on an  appro-
priate  basis,  the participation of the  representatives of organ-
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ized  labour,  would  constitute the right  kind of body  to  deal 
with  the European  public  authorities  responsible  for  financ-
ing, overall  control  and sponsorship of the joint  programme. 
Finally,  individual  projects  would  be  organized  by  intercom-
pany working groups who would be responsible for  coordinat-
ing  development  and  production. 
To sum up, for  many  years  continuous conflicts of commer-
cial  interests have  made it  impossible  for  the main  European 
companies to come together in  a single grouping. At the same 
time, specific  cooperative  projects  have  linked  them  together 
in a complex network which  has  made impracticable the for-
mation of two or three separate groups. SeriGlls economic pro-
blems  and  the  growing  unity  in  the  industry,  which  is 
reflected  in  the development of a  consensus on a single pro-
gramme for  large  civil  aircraft,  have  made  the  time  ripe  for 
a debate on the launching of a single organization to  manage 
the production of large civil  transport aircraft, crowning in  its 
turn a series of intercompany  working groups  responsible for 
particular  projects.  Individual  companies  could  continue  to 
compete  amongst  themselves  for  smaller  aircraft,  such  as 
business  jets.  Methods  of  collaboration  for  military  pro-
grammes should  of course  be  different. 
Employment and productivit~ 
Concentration of all  industrial efforts on a  limited  number of 
programmes  selected  in  response  to  market . requirements, 
defined in collaboration with the airlines and with  full  backing 
at  the sales and after-sales phase should result  in  longer pro-
duction  runs  and  therefore  in  higher  productivity. 
However,  effort  is  necessary  to  improve  the  level  of man 
hours  per  unit  of production, and  work  in  this  field  is  being 
carried  out  by  the main  European companies, particularly  in 
the  following  areas: 
- application  of value  engineering; 
- cost  control  for  components; 
- indirect  cost  reduction; 
- effects  of the  learning  curve; 
- methods  and  cost  inherent  in  international  collaboration; 
- improved  methods  of production  control. 
The results of such studies and their practical  application  will 
provide  the counterpart  from  industry  to  the support of the 
joint  programme  which  is  required  of the public  authorities. 
It is  extremely  difficult  to  predict  at  the moment the likely 
consequences  on the  level  of employment of the process  of 
rationalization  towards  achieving . a  common  programme; 
detailed information would be necessary not only on the plan-
ning  of civil  aircraft  production  but also  on  military  aircraft 
production. 
Nevertheless the fact  that  turnover of the  aerospace sector is 
expandin&  overall,  even  though  the  manufacture  of  civil 
31 transport  aircraft  is  currently  at  a  very  low  level  compared 
with  the objectives  proposed  in  the framework  of a Commu-
nity programme, does not allow one to conclude that any  pro-
cess of rationalization will  necessarily lead to an overall  reduc-
tion  in  numbers employed, though it  may  lead  to changes in 
structure of employment (for example,  increases  in  sales  and 
commercial  staff)  and  therefore  require  concomitant  social 
measures. It will  be  necessary  to  examine in  detail the effects 
on the structure, volume and location of jobs, and on working 
conditions, with  a  view  to  preserving  balanced  employment. 
This examination  should  take  as  a starting  point the existing 
infrastructure,  for  example,  the  qualitative  role  of research 
and  development  centres  and  the  regional  function  of the 
operation  of certain  companies,  particularly  when  they  are  ·a 
vital  element in the economic life of the area.  It will  be  neces-
sary  as  a result, to study the structure of employment, work-
ing  conditions  and  basic  and  further  training  in  the  various 
branches of the aircraft and space industry and related sectors. 
These studies could serve  as  the basis  for  eventual interven-
tion  by  the  European  Social  Fund  and  European  Regional 
Development  Fund,  particularly  in  cases  of  re-location  of 
work  and  vocational  re-training. 
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Annex V 
Financing methods 
Four  types  of possible  financial  support  can  be  singled  out: 
- Financing  qf research  and  development:  the  objective&  of 
financing  in  this  area  can  be  divided  into  two  categories: 
•  a  programme  for  basic  research  in  the  medium- and  the 
long-term  whose  aim  is  to  provide  industry  with  a stock  of 
technical  know-how  which  should  be  financed  out  of Com-
munity  resources, 
•  a  programme  of applied  research  in  the  short  term  and 
developments  of  specific  commercial  projects  (including 
necessary  tooling)  which  obviously  must  be  in  part  financed 
by  industry. 
Community  financing  would  be  provided  partly  out  of the 
budget  of the  Community  and  for  certain  types  of support 
partly  from  funds  raised  on  the capital  market. 
- Support for rationalizing the means o.f production and market-
ing:  this  would  be  provided essentially from  loans  granted by 
Community  institutions  and  perhaps  through  the  European 
Investment  Bank  on  the  basis  of Commission  Directives .. 
- Export  credits  and guarantees: the work carried out to date 
to  harmonize  national  policies  and  practices  has  shown  how 
difficult  it  is  to  provide  sufficiently  efficient  and  flexible 
export  credits  and  guarantees  for  projects  carried  out on  an 
international collaborative  basis  to  meet  terms offered  by  the 
competition. The Commission in  a separate document has set 
out  for  the  Council  its  views  on  the  need  to  create a Com-
munity  body  for  this  type  of  activity,  in  other  words  a 
genuine European Export Bank.l  Whilst the mandate of such 
a  Bank  would  be  to  provide  support  for  many  branches  of 
industry,  it  is  quite clear  that  the aeronautical sector, bearing 
in  mind  the  multinational  nature  of its  products,  is  one  of 
those  which  make  the  creation  of such  a  body  a  matter  of 
urgency. 
The  potential  customers  of European  industry  when  they 
negotiate  with  manufacturers  who  are  competitors  of  the 
European  industry,  are  dealing  generally  with  a  single  con-
tractor, in  a single  currency, and  with  a single credit  agency. 
The seller  is  therefore  capable  of providing at  the same time 
not  only  an  aircraft  but  also  a  set  of financial  conditions 
which enable the purchaser to see quite clearly  the effects his 
purchase  will  have  on  his  operation  and  ~eturns. 
The purpose  of an  export  credit  system  should  be  to  create 
conditions in  which  European  industry can  benefit from  facil-
ities comparable to  those available to its  overseas competitors: 
'  Bull.  EC  7/8-1975,  point  2309. 
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•  it  should be able to offer conditions (interest rates, payback 
periods, percentage of contract value  financed).  which  whilst 
taking  account  of international  commitments,  would  be  no 
less favourable  than those offered  by  third party  competitors; 
•  it  should  be  extremely  flexible  and  rapid  in  its  decision-
making  process. 
- The .financing of  sales within the Community: until economic 
and  monetary  union  is  achieved  in  the Community,  manu-
facturers  will  continue  to encounter on  the  internal  market 
the  same  difficulties  as  on  the  external  market.  It  will  be 
necessarY  then, by  means  yet  to  be  decided  for  sales  within 
the EEC  to  have common  financial  support. 
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Proposal  for  a  Council  Decision 
concerning  the  creation  of a  common  policy 
in  the  civil  aircraft  and  aviation  sector The Council of  the European Communities, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the 
European Economic Community, and in  particu-
lar  Articles 84 (2)  and  235  thereof; 
Having regard to the proposal  from  the Commis-
sion; 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion  of the  European 
Parliament; 
Having  regard  to  the  Opinion  of the  Economic 
and  Social  Committee; 
Whereas  the  aim  of  the  European  Economic 
Community is  'to promote throughout the Com-
munity  the  harmonious  development  of  econ-
omic  activities,  continuous  and  balanced  expan-
sion,  increased  stability,  an accelerated  improve-
ment in  the standard of living and close relations 
between Member States' (Article 2 of the Treaty); 
Whereas those economic activities  relating to  the 
civil  aircraft  and  aviation  industries  are  of parti-
cular  importance;  whereas  within  this  sector  the 
aircraft industry has been tending to  lose its out-
lets  on  world  markets,  including  those  of  the 
European  market,  while  the aviation  industry  is 
characterized  by  a  rigid  compartmentalization  of 
national  markets, wherein traffic rights are essen-
tially shared out by  reference to the nationality of 
the air  transport  companies; 
Whereas, given  the scale of the problems arising 
from  the  situation  described  above,  national 
intervention is  no longer capable  of ensuring- the 
harmonious development of activities within  the 
sector  under  consideration,  and  whereas  to  this 
end it  is  necessary to  provide for  the initiation of 
common action concerning the aircraft  and  avia-
tion  industries; 
Whereas the difficulties of the European civil  air-
craft  industry  are  due  mainly  to  the  absence  of 
an overall  strategy in relation both to  intra-Com-
munity cooperation and to cooperation with non-
member  States,  to  the  lack  of financial  support 
from  the  Community  to  ensure  that  European 
products  are  competitive  in  the  world  market, 
and to the lack of concerted action on the part of 
the European air transport companies with a view 
to orienting production towards market objectives 
corresponding  to  real  requirements; 
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Whereas  the  European  aircraft  industry,  thanks 
to  the level  of its  technology, its  design  capabil-
ities,  and  its  technical,  human  and  financial 
infrastructure,  can  regain  an  important  role  on 
the world  market provided  that efforts are  made 
substantially to  improve  its  productivity  through 
rationalization  and  cooperation; 
Whereas  however, there  is  a  risk  that any effort 
on  the part  of the industry will  once more  prove 
fruitless unless real common action is  undertaken 
embracing all the problems relating to this sector; 
Whereas  to  this  end  it  is  necessary  to  establish 
a common  policy  for  the  aircraft  industry,  such 
policy  to  consist  in  particular  of:  the  establish-
ment of a common programme  for  the develop-
ment,  manufacture  and  marketing  of large  civi1 
transport  aircraft,  including  activities  carried  out 
in  collaboration  with  third  country  manufactur-
ers;  the  establishment  of  a  common  basic 
research  programme;  the  common  financing  of 
research, development and  production tooling for 
specific  programmes;  a  Community  system  of 
financial  support for .marketing; and the harmon-
ization  of national  laws,  regulations  and  admin-
istrative  provisions  dealing  with  certification  of 
airworthiness,  environmental  nuisance,  norms 
and  standards; 
Whereas  in  the  sector  under  consideration  the 
purpose of a common policy  designed  to  replace 
national policies  must be  to enable projects  to  be 
undertaken  whose  size  would  be  beyond  the 
financial  capability of any national  industry or of 
any  one  Member  State  in  isolation;  whereas  in 
these  circumstances  it  would  be  wrong  to  allow 
the success of the common programme to be jeo-
pardized  by  the  launching  of new,  competing, 
State-aided  national  projects; 
Whereas,  given  the  considerable  effort  required 
by  the Community to  put a common programme 
into effect, it  is  appropriate to seek to concentrate 
public  resources on financing  its  implementation; 
whereas  steps  should therefore be  taken to  prev-
ent the undertaking of national projects  likely  to 
lead  to  a  dispersion  of effort  and  to  make  the 
common policy  unworkable; whereas to this end 
the only effective method of ensuring the success 
of the common  programme  under the  best  con-
ditions  consists  in  the  creation  of a  common 
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systems  pf national  aid; 
Whereas, in  order to make  the process  of trans-
ition  towards  the  financing  system  described 
above  a  gradual  one, provision  should  be  made 
for  national  aids  to  be  phased  out  gradually; 
whereas  it  should  accordingly  be  provided  that 
State  aids  or aids  provided  from  State  resources 
in  those  areas  which·  are  to  be  the  subject  of 
common  financing  are  to  be  replaced  by  this 
method -of  financing  within  five  years· from  the 
date on which the new system is  put into effect; 
whereas  at  the  end  of this  perioq  the  Member 
States  should refrain  from  providing  State aid  in 
the areas  mentioned above, same  in  so  far  as  is 
permitted  under Article 92 (2)  of the Treaty; 
Whereas the establishment of a common air pol-
icy  requires. the  establishment  of  a  European 
market  in  all  its  aspects,  including  air  services 
between  Member  States;  whereas  at  present  the 
structure  of these  services  does  not  correspond 
fully  to  the needs  of traffic  growth  in  the Com-
munity, especially with regard  to European inter-
regional  links; 
Whereas  the  creation  of  a  European  common 
market requires that the Community should esta-
blish  as  objectives  in  respect  of air  transport  on 
the one hand the creation of a European airspace 
to be managed ona Community basis, thus mak-
ing  it  possible  to  provide  the  public  at  the best 
price  possible  with  services  better  tailored  to  its 
needs,  through  the  introduction  of new  services 
and  the  diversification  of existing  services  and 
the rationalization of route  networks,  particularly 
for  inter-regional  traffic,  and  on  the  other hand 
the  negotiation  and  conclusion  of  agreements 
between  the  Community  and  third  countries, 
particularly  in  respect  of traffic  rights,  with  the 
aim  of optimizing  international  routes  and  ser-
vices; 
Whereas  objectives  should  be  achieved  by  pro-
gressive steps enabling the transition towards the 
Community  system  envisaged  above  to  be 
achieved in  a balanced  way; whereas  to  this end 
appropriate action in the specific fields  will  be  set 
in  motion  as  soon  as  possible; 
Whereas  the  achievement  of the  objectives  and 
actions  mentioned above  will  have an  important 
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impact in  that it  will create an economic environ-
ment favourable  to  the harmonization of the cri-
teria on which the structure of route networks is 
based (frequency,  routes, size of aircraft)  and on 
which  the  purchaser's  choice  of  aircraft  thus 
depends; 
Whereas  it  is  for  the  Commission  to  propose 
measures for  the implementation of the schemes 
set  out  above;  and  whereas,  to  accomplish  this 
task, it  will  require  full  knowledge of all  matters 
relevant  to  the measures envisaged  by  the com-
mon policy  in  this  field; 
Whereas to this end Member States, manufactur-
ers  and  air  transport  companies  s-hould  be 
required  to  provide  the  Commission  with  the 
necessary  information;  and  whereas  the  condi-
tions  and  detailed  rules  relating  to  this  require-
ment will  be  established  by  the Council  on  pro-
posals  from  the  Commission; 
Whereas, as  regards action in respect of air trans-
port, provision should be  made for  the necessary 
measures to  be  adopted by  the Council acting by 
a qualified  majority on a proposal  from  the Com-
mission  and  after  consultation  of the  Economic 
and Social  Committee and of the European  Par-
liament; 
Whereas, as  regards certain action  relating to  the 
common policy  in the aircraft construction sector, 
the Treaty  does  not  provide  the  necessary  pow-
ers; whereas  such  action  is  necessary  in  order to 
attain, in  the course of the operation of the com-
mon  market,  the  objectives  of the  Community 
set  out  in  Article 2 of the  Treaty;  whereas  it  is 
therefore  necessary  to  have  recourse  to  Article 
235  of the Treaty, 
Has adopted this decision: 
Article 1 
There is  hereby established  a common policy  for 
the  civil  aircraft  industry.  The  purpose  of such 
policy  is  to  ensure  the optimal  use  of resources 
while  being  at  the same time essentially  adapted 
to  market  requirements. 
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(a)  the establishment of a common programme 
for  all  activities in connection with the manufac-
ture  of  large  civil  transport  aircraft  including 
those carried  out in collaboration  with  manufac-
turers  in  third  countries~ 
(b)  the common financing,  to replace  individual 
national  financing  of research,  of development, 
and of production  tooling  for  the common  pro-
gramme  referred  to  in (a); 
(c)  the establishment of a common  programme 
for certain areas of basic research receiving  Com-
munity  financing; 
(d)  a  system of financial  support  by  the  Com-
munity for  marketing; 
(e)  the  harmonization  of the  laws,  regulations 
and  administrative  provisions  of  the  Member 
States dealing with certification of airworthiness, 
environmental  nuisance,  norms  and  standards. 
Article 2 
I.  Aids  granted  by  the  State  or  out  of State 
resources  in  the areas  to be  the subject  of com-
mon  financing  in  accordance  with  Article 1  (b) 
shall  be  replaced  by  such  a  common  financing 
system within five years from the date when that 
system  is  put into  effect. 
2.  At  the  end  of this  period,  Member  States 
shall, save as permitted under Article 92(2) of the 
Treaty,  provide  no  further  national  aid  in  these 
areas. 
Article 3 
Action  by  the  Community  in  the  field  of  air 
transport  shall  have  as  its  main  objectives: 
(a)  the  creation  of a  European  airspace,  to  be 
managed  on  a  Community  basis  and  involving 
the establishment in  respect of intra-Community 
traffic  of  a  system  of  regulated  competition, 
whose aim will  be  to provide the public with ser-
vices better tailored to its needs, at the best prices 
possible,  through  the  introduction  of new  ser-
vices  and  the diversification  of existing  services 
and the rationalization of route networks, particu-
larly  in  inter-regional  traffic. 
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(b)  the  conclusion  of agreements  between  the 
Community  and  third  countries,  particularly  in 
respect  of  traffic  rights  and  with  the  aim  of 
optimizing  international  routes  and  services. 
Article 4 
1.  The provisions necessary for the implementa-
tion of the measures set out in Article l, shall be 
adopted  by  the  Council  in  accordance  with  the 
rules of the Treaty, on proposals  from  the Com-
mission  and  after  consultation  with  the  Econo-
mic  and  Social  Committee  and  with  the  Euro-
pean  Parliament. 
2.  The provisions required  for  the realization of 
the  objectives  set  out  in  Article 3  shall  be 
adopted  by  the  Council  acting,  by  a  qualified 
majority, on proposals from  the Commission and 
after consultation  with  the  Economic and Social 
Committee and  the  European  Parliament. 
3.  In  preparing  its  proposals,  the  Commission 
shall  consult  governmental  authorities  in  the 
Member States, manufacturers, air transport com-
panies  and  trade  unions.  They  may  present  to 
the Commission any views or suggestions on the 
measures  and  objectives  set  out  in  Articles  1 
and  3. 
Article 5 
1.  The  Member  States,  manufacturers  and  air 
transport  companies  shall  provide  the  Commis-
sion  with  the necessary  data and  information  in 
order to enable  it  to  carry out the tasks  required 
of it  under this  Decision. 
2.  Conditions  and  detailed  rules  shall  be  laid 
down  by  the  Council  on  proposals  from  the 
Commission. 
Article 6 
This Decision is  addressed to the Member States. 
Done  at  Brussels, 
For the Council 
The  President 
39 Draft  Resolution 
of representatives  of the  Member States 
of the  European  Economic  Community 
meeting  within  the  Council 
relating  to the  purchase  and  development 
of aircraft  weapon  systems The  Member  States  of the  European  Economic 
Community, 
Conscious  of the  importance  to  the  European 
aerospace industry of the military aircraft  market 
and of that industry's direct  dependence on gov-
ernment  policies; 
Conscious  too  that  the close  links  which  exist 
between  civil  and  military  technology  result  in 
the fact  that difficulties ·or successes  met  in  one 
bear  directly  on the  other; 
Conscious  that  the  scale  of development  costs 
and  the  need  to  achieve  economies  of scale  in 
production have led  to the setting up of a certain 
number  of European  collaborative  projects,  but 
that this limited collaboration must now  be  sup-
plemented  by  the establishment of a  systematic 
common  policy  in  this  field; 
Convinced  that the  duplication  of developments 
at  national  level  as  well  as  the cost  of multiple 
logistic support organization and of separate spare 
part systems result  inevitably in  a massive waste 
of public  funds; 
Convinc~d of the necessity  for  developing a sub-
stantial and balanced  aircraft  weapons  trade with 
the United States while safeguarding an adequate 
design  ar1d  production  capability  in  Europe; 
Here by agree as follows: 
1.  To consider the creation of a European Mili-
tary  Aircraft  Procurement  Agency,  whose  task 
will be to coordinate the purchase of aircraft wea-
pon systems, to identify common future require-
ments,  and  to  initiate  new  common  develop-
ments to  meet them, while acting  in  close  colla-
boration  with  Community  institutions  so  that 
they  may  be in  a position  to  administer the pol-
icy for the aircraft industry in full  posession of all 
the  necessary  information. 
2.  To open discussions with the United States of 
America on sales and cooperation in  the field  of 
defence equipment, with the following  objectives: 
- the  mutual  opening  up  of markets  with  a 
view  to  the  development  of the  two-way  trade 
going  beyond  production  under licence; 
- the  safeguarding  of  the  role  of  European 
industry  in  the  major  sectors  of technology. 
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